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0MB Circular A- 76 (Contracting out Commercial Activities) is a
controversial program which directs the Government to rely on the private
sector for commercial services when evaluated cost is lower in the private
sector. Many A- 76 contracts experience cost increases after contract
award. An earlier study of three USCG A- 76 contracts showed that
Department of Labor (DOL) wage determinations and added work caused cost
increases, but the contracts were still cost effective. This thesis
updated the earlier study of three activities and analyzed three
additional USCG commercial activities to see if DOL wage determinations,
added work, or additional factors caused cost increases, and what the
Coast Guard contracting officer could do to control them. In addition,
contract costs were compared with the Government's Most Efficient
Organization (MEO) for each activity to see if Government savings were
still being realized.
There are problems in the implementation of A- 76 that may be
associated with the perceptions of its effectiveness. To gauge USCG
perceptions of the effectiveness of A- 76, interviews were conducted with
USCG leaders from units with "contracted-out" commercial activities.
These were compared with interviews conducted with leaders from units that
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The Office of Management and Budget's (0MB) Circular A-76 is a
controversial program which directs the Government to rely on the private
sector for "Commercial" services when evaluated cost is lower in the
private sector. The A-76 process is complex and requires:
• Identification of a Government agency's "Commercial Activities" (with
some exceptions given in the policy) that could be contracted out
;
• A usually lengthy study of the activity to determine the Most
Efficient Organization (MEO) for that activity as run by the
Government agency;
• A competition between the Government agency' s (MEO) and responsible
private firms;
" A second round review five years after the original study is
completed for all Commercial Activities retained by the Government
agency.
There are many problems associated with the implementation of OMB
Circular A-76, they include:
• The perception that A-76's purpose is to cut personnel and jobs
rather than to have an efficient organization resulting in cost
savings to the Government [53:p.5]
.
• Lengthy studies that are many times inaccurate and a burden on the
activity being studied [52:p.3].
• The need for a Contracting Officer' s Technical Representative (COTR)
who is normally in place for a short duration (2-3 years) , and who
receives limited training or experience in quality assurance [57].
• The fact that once an activity is contracted-out under A-76, it is
extremely difficult to return the effort "in-house" to the Government
[36:p.42]
.
Since implementation of OMB Circular A-76 by the U.S. Coast Guard,
people have questioned whether this program has resulted in cost savings
for the Government. It is perceived that once a Commercial Activity is
contracted-out, contract costs continue to increase excessively and the
command loses flexibility in use of those Government personnel displaced
by the contractor. This thesis will determine the cost effectiveness of
some of these activities that have been contracted-out, and present the
current perceptions of this program by experienced Coast Guard officers in
the field.
B. STUDY OBJECTIVES/RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary objectives of this thesis are to:
• Study USCG Commercial Activities (CA) that have been "contracted-out"
and have experienced cost increases, and determine the causes of the
cost increases.
• Determine if the studied contracted-out activities are performing at
less cost than the Government's Most Efficient Organization (MEO)
.
• Gather perceptions of the USCG A-76 program by some USCG units with
commercial activities contracted-out and those with CA' s that
remained "in-house".
The primary research questions are:
• What are the primary causes of contract cost increases for certain
U.S. Coast Guard activities contracted-out under A-76 and how might
these increases be controlled? (and)
• What is the general perception of A-76 by USCG units with contracted-
out commercial activities and those with commercial activities
remaining in-house?
Subsidiary research questions to support and supplement the primary
research questions include:
• What is the contracting-out policy under Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-76 and how is the prograim implemented in the Coast
Guard?
• What factors contribute to cost increases following award of
contracts solicited under A-76?
• What has been the relationship between the contractors and Coast
Guard activities where A-76 contracts are being performed?
• What actions can be taken by the Coast Guard to reduce or eliminate
contract cost increases following award?
• What is the U.S. Coast Guard perception of the effectiveness of the
A-76 process and results?
• Do Commanding/Executive Officers believe in the A-76 process?
C. SCOPE OF STUDY
This thesis will follow-up on a study of cost increases of USCG
contracted-out commercial activities completed in 1989 by LCDR Michael
Omatsu, USCG. This study will determine if the factors LCDR Omatsu found
that caused cost increases continue to increase contract costs, and if the
activities he studied are still realizing a savings to the Government. In
addition, this study will review other U.S. Coast Guard contracted-out
CA' s to determine causes for cost increase and if Government savings are
still being realized. All of the U.S. Coast Guard Commands that have A-76
contracted-out activities reviewed in this study, and other units that
retained some commercial activities in-house (operating under the MEO)
were questioned to determine their perceptions of A-76 implementation.
D . METHODOLOGY
In conducting the research for this thesis, data were collected from
numerous sources for different study areas. For background on 0MB
Circular A-76 and on Government and U.S. Coast Guard implementation of the
Circular, a custom bibliography was requested from the Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) in Fort Lee, VA. Facilities at the
Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA were
also used, as well as a review of articles and Government documents held
in faculty files. Telephone interviews with Coast Guard Headquarters
staff in Washington, DC, and Contract management personnel at the
Maintenance & Logistics Command, Pacific (MLCPAC) in Alameda, CA were also
conducted in this area of research.
In studying the contracted-out Commercial Activities and determining
cost increases and reviewing administration of the contracts, LCDR
Omatsu' s thesis on three contracted-out activities was reviewed. USCG
Contract records on activities studied by LCDR Omatsu were reviewed as
well as three additional Pacific Area contracts contracted-out under A-76.
Two research trips were conducted to MLCPAC in Alameda, CA to view the
contract records, conduct interviews, and discuss the administration of
the contracts with each contract's Contract Specialist. Extensive
telephone interviews were also conducted with Coast Guard Commands that
have the contracted-out activities reviewed in this study. These
interviews were held with Commanding Officers, Executive Officers,
Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives (COTR) , the Contractor's
Project Manager on-site. Contractors, and Coast Guard Headquarters staff
in Washington, DC.
In gathering information on USCG perceptions related to the
implementation of OMB Circular A-76, telephone interviews were conducted
with Commanding Officers and/or Executive Officers of the six USCG
commands that had A-76 contracts, and two USCG Commands that didn't
(commercial activities that won with MEO)
.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I is a background
on the evolution and implementation of OMB Circular A-76, questions to be
answered in this thesis, and the methodology used. Chapter II is the
background and problems encountered with the Coast Guard's implementation
of A-76 and a summary of the results from the past study of three CA' s by
LCDR Omatsu.
Chapter III is an updated study on the three Commercial Activities
(CA) studied by LCDR Omatsu, and a study of three additional CA' s . The
last two sections of this chapter discuss the reasons for the cost
increases and compare the overall cost of performance with the MEO.
Chapter IV is a grouping of the various perceptions on implementation
of the USCG A-76 progreim by Commanding Officers and/or Executive Officers
of USCG Commands that have contracted-out Commercial Activities, and some
commands operating with the MEO.
Chapter V contains the conclusions of this study, recommendations,
answers to thesis questions, and recommendations for further research.
II . BACKGROtJND
A. OMB CIRCULAR A-76
The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-76 describes
a controversial program that is a part of the U.S. Government's emphasis
to rely on the commercial sector for goods and services. The U.S.
Government has long promoted that a Government should not be in
competition with the private sector, however, the policy for the
forerunner of A-76 was not formalized until the mid-1950' s.
1. What is A-76?
In the process of governing, the Government should not compete
with its citizens. The competitive enterprise system, characterized
by individual freedom and initiative, is the primary source of the
national economic strength. In recognition of this principle, it has
been and continues to be the general policy of the Government to rely
on commercial sources to supply the products and services the
Government needs. [34:p.l]
This is the background statement of OMB Circular A-76 "Performance of
Commercial Activities." Its main purpose is to achieve efficiencies in
Government by encouraging competition between the Federal work force and
the private sector for providing commercial services needed by Government
agencies. [54:p.l]
In 1955, the formal introduction and framework for the present A-76
policy surfaced with OMB' s predecessor. The Bureau of the Budget issuing
Bulletin 55-4. This Bulletin's policy was for Government agencies to rely
solely on commercial sources of supply with the costs of Government -run
operations a factor only in cases where the agency determined that the
product or service couldn't be purchased competitively at a reasonable
price. This policy stated in effect that the Government was not to
start-up or conduct an activity that produced a good or provided a service
to the Government if it could be procured from the commercial sector
[52:p.l0]. Additional Bulletins were issued in 1957 and 1960.
The original OMB circular A-76 was issued in 1966. The Circular was
revised in 1967 with a major policy change to use competition between
Government-run commercial activities and the private sector, where the
costs and Government savings were to be factored into the decision to keep
the function with the Government (in-house) or contract-out to the private
sector. This policy modified the belief that the Government should not
compete with the private sector, however the 1967 revision did not provide
detailed guidance on how agencies were to compare cost with the private
sector [52 :p . 10]
.
It was not until the 1979 revision to the Circular that guidance was
provided on how to maintain consistency in cost comparisons. This
revision also provided the Government with a new management concept of
defining needs for a commercial activity by measurable work standards, and
not on "how" the activity was done [52:p.ll].
The latest complete revision to A-76 was issued on August 4, 1983,
which required management efficiency studies for all Government commercial
activities. This revision also contained a supplement which provided
standardized procedures to assist in implementing A-76 [35] . The current
A-76 policy statement of the U.S. Government is [34:p.l-2]
:
" To achieve economy and enhance productivity. Whenever an in-house
function can be performed by the commercial sector, a comparison of
the cost of contracting and the cost of in-house operation of the
function will be made to determine who will do the work.
• Retain Governmental functions in-house. Certain functions are
inherently Governmental, not in competition with the commercial
sector, and in the public interest, are required to be
Government-run
.
• Rely on the Commercial Sector. The Government is to rely on
commercially available sources to provide commercial products and
services. The Government will not start any commercial activity if
the product or service can be provided more economically from a
commercial source.
"Commercial activities" are various services as defined by A-76.
These functions include but are not limited to [34:p.7-10]:
Audiovisual Products & Services ADP Services
Food Services Health Services
Industrial Shops & Services Management Support
Maintenance, Overhaul, Repair Office & Admin
& Testing Laundry




Processing, Testing, & Packaging
Since the 1983 revision of A-76, 0MB has issued "transmittal notices"
to provide changes in cost calculations. The latest Governmental
Directive of significance affecting the A-76 program is Executive Order
12615 which was issued on November 19, 1987. This Order required Agencies
to conduct annual studies of not less than 3 percent of their civilian
work force until all identified potential commercial activities have been
studied [59]
.
Since its implementation, there have been many attempts in the
Congress to put A-76 policy into law, with the General Accounting Office
strongly supporting legislation in 1978, 1981, and 1986, but none have
been successful [53:p.8].
2. How is A—76 iit^lemented?
When 0MB began implementing A-76, Government agencies were
required to identify "commercial activities" that could be done by the
private sector as defined by the policy. Activities that remained
in-house were required to meet one of the following criteria [34:p.4-5]:
• No satisfactory commercial source available.
• National defense reasons. The Secretary of Defense must authorize
this exemption.
• Patient care. Where Government operated hospitals are used in the
best interest of patient care. A reason for this could be from the
complexities and difficulties in conducting an accurate cost
comparison of military and civilian care. Also this exemption could
be to maintain a military medical capability.
• Government performance costs are lower than a qualified commercial
source
.
Government agencies were required to develop an inventory of
commercial activities which were reviewed by the agency for A-76
consideration and then reviewed by OMB for approval. The activities
identified for A-76 "review" were for some agencies placed on an OMB
approved timetable for completion. The agency was then to commence
reviews for each activity and also provide an annual report to OMB on A-76
progress
.
Each review is an in-depth management study of the commercial activity
as it is conducted in-house. The first phase of the review is preparation
of a Performance Work Statement (PWS) for the function. The PWS is a
Statement of Work (SOW) which contains the specifications that basically
described what the function is and what it takes to do it. A Quality
Assurance (QA) plan for a possible service contract is also developed
within the PWS. The QA plan is the action to be taken by the Government
to ensure the goods and services received from the activity meet the
requirement of the PWS.
From the PWS, and in some cases while it is being developed, the best
organizational structure and operating procedure for the function is
determined. This structure is known as the Most Efficient Organization
(MEO) . The MEO is intended to encourage efficiency by "cutting the fat"
in the Government-run commercial activity by reducing costs and reduction
of personnel as necessary. The cost of operating the function in-house
under the MEO is then determined.
The PWS is then used as part of a solicitation by the agency to offer
the activity in competition with the private sector using the Government
cost of the MEO. Most solicitations for these potential contracts use the
Invitation for Bid (IFB/sealed bid) method as many service contracts can
be competed primarily on price. However, some contracts may be negotiated
depending on the PWS, or when using a "small and disadvantaged" firm under
the Small Business Administrations Section 8A set-aside program. Bids or
proposals will be on at least a three year basis for multi-year funding.
or cover two fiscal years after the initial year for single year funding.
In using the sealed bid process, the confidentiality of all cost data is
maintained to ensure that Government and contract cost remain independent,
where the contracting officer does not know the in-house cost estimate
until bid opening [35:p.IV-3]. At the bid opening, the offeror and MEO
costs are compared. If the total cost of contracting out is less than the
MEO' s cost by more than 10 percent of the MEO' s personnel related costs,
and the offeror is determined to be responsible, then the commercial
activity is contracted-out. However, if the offeror's cost is within 10
percent of the MEO cost or greater than the MEO, the activity remains
in-house [35
:
p . IV-41 ]
.
In functions having less than 10 full-time equivalents (FTE) (one FTE
is normally comparable to one employee) as determined in the management
study, a cost comparison is not required as long as the price is "fair &
reasonable". A "fair & reasonable" determination is based on having a
niamber of firms in that service industry resulting in competition which
would induce fair & reasonable prices [35:p.I-12].
Under A-76, the commercial activity remaining in-house is required to
have a second review five years after the original study is completed.
The intended result from both in-house or contracting-out determinations
is a cost saving by the Government not only in money, but by hopefully
having a more efficient activity for in-house determinations. The entire
review process has proven to be very long, and an effective study requires
advanced planning and preparation, skill, and a comprehensive analysis of
the function.
Once a commercial activity is contracted-out, it is very difficult for
the Government to return the activity back in-house. For the Government
to take back the function, the MEO developed would have to better a
private sector offeror by a ten percent cost increment (twenty percent
lower than the originally competed MEO cost) plus twenty-five percent of
the contractor's capital assets cost. Also the Government agency's
Secretary must approve the return to in-house. There are two reasons to
recompete or have another cost comparison study. They are: (1) in
response to unsatisfactory service, or (2) if the contract costs become
unreasonable
.
B. THE COAST GUARD AND A-76
The Coast Guard's first response to A-76 was to take little to no
action. Following the 1979 revision of A-76, the Coast Guard estimated
that it would need 60 full-time employees to carry out the activity review
requirements of A-76. At the time, the Coast Guard's official position
was that no billets were available in the service for reprogramming to
perform this function, and when requested, OMB would not authorize
additional billets. While the other military Services in DOD began
reviews and started contracting-out their commercial activities, the Coast
Guard had "dodged the A-76 bullet" for the time being [1].
After the 1983 revision of A-76, OMB authorized the Coast Guard 20
billets (15 civilian and 5 military) to implement the program, and on
February 24, 1984, a Department of Transportation (DOT) order directed the
Coast Guard to comply with A-76. The new Coast Guard billets were placed
in a new staff element, COMDT(G-A76) at USCG Headquarters in Washington,
DC. G-A76 formed an "A-76 Task force" and began planning to review all
commercial activities in the Coast Guard [1]
.
In 1984, a major incentive for the Coast Guard to quickly implement
A-76 came about after OMB had examined the inventory of Coast Guard's
civilian billets maintained by the Office of Personnel Management, and
concluded that 4200 of these billets could possibly be deleted starting
with first cuts in 1985. G-A76 was now required to speed-up their
implementation of A-76 to minimize the effects of the billet cuts
[36:p.9]. For Coast Guard civilian personnel assigned to Coast Guard
Headquarters and not familiar with the overall effectiveness principle of
10
A-76, this researcher personally observed views that A-76 suddenly meant
the threat of "reduction in force" (RIF)
.
G-A76's first major action in A-76 implementation came with sending
a message directive to all Coast Guard units requiring a listing of all
their commercial activities in order to compile the inventory for
consideration of A-76 review. This instruction was not as specific as it
should have been, as responses were many and varied and came back with
statements and questions about the potential impact of A-76, but G-A76
took what came in and began compiling the Coast Guard's A-76 review
inventory [ 1 ] .
In the first two years of the reviews (1985-86) all early management
studies (PWS and MEO costing) and solicitations in the Commerce Business
Daily (CBD) or through SEA were coordinated by G-A76 because this was a
new program to the Coast Guard, and all the A-76 program billets were in
Washington, DC.
By 1987, a number of major A-76 reviews had been completed in
different service areas. With established contracts and excimple PWS's as
guides, many reviews of commercial activities were being conducted by the
units having the commercial activity being studied with oversight by G-A76
[1] -
Initially many of the reviewed functions that were contracted-out were
reserved for small disadvantage businesses (Section 8 (a) of the Small
Business Act) with the SBA as the prime contractor. Small business quotas
for annual Coast Guard contract dollars are set by COMDT (G-CPM) and have
varied between 8-10 percent for all contracts. The option to initially
use 8 (a) firms for A-76 commercial activities made contracting-out easier
for the Coast Guard because a cost comparison was not required, and it was
also helping the Coast Guard achieve it's overall annual SBA monitored
8(a) quotas. In some commercial activities, such as food service, using
small businesses in competition may soon be the only option. On October
31, 1991, a contract was awarded for an A-76 recompeted contract for food
11
service in Kodiak, Alaska. There, 11 small businesses submitted bids for
the contract [9]. Some large contractors are also moving away from A-76
food service contracts because they are losing money due to increasing
labor costs through union led wage increases [41].
Most of the Coast Guard's A-76 contracted-out commercial activities
are competed using the sealed bid method because many of the service
contracts are based on price alone. However, some solicitations are
Requests for Proposals (RFP) and negotiated depending on the type of work
required, the PWS, and if they are set-aside for small business.
After 1987, the initial A-76 reviews and solicitations were completed
by not only G-A76, but by the administrative commander of the field unit
and the field unit having the commercial activity, with follow-on
solicitations and contract administration conducted by the Contract
Branches of the Maintenance & Logistics Command (MLC) in New York for
Atlantic Area units and Alameda for Pacific Area [1].
In 1988, G-A76 was reduced to 12 persons and renaimed the Commercial
Activities Branch (COMDT (G-CPE-4) ) . In 1991, with a reduction in A-76
reviews, this branch was renamed the Resources Assessment Branch
(COMDT (G-CPP-2) ) . Final authority and oversight of the Coast Guard's A-76
program remains with this branch. Since the initial activity inventory
message directive, G-A76, G-CPE-4, and now G-CPP-2 have not issued any
Coast Guard Directives concerning the implementation of A-76, but maintain
that they have closely monitored all reviews [1,6]
.
Once the Coast Guard contracts-out a commercial activity, it is highly
likely that it will remain contracted-out. While a few contracted-out
activities have resulted in another cost comparison study, only two Coast
Guard contracted-out activities have been returned to in-house [6].
The first commercial activity that returned in-house was at the
Support Center and Air Station at Elizabeth City, NC, for Aircraft Crash-
Rescue services. The contractor went bankrupt and defaulted on the
contract. The Air Station had no Crash-Rescue service available for
12
approximately 24 hours while the Air Station organized adequately trained
personnel to take the contractor's place. Without this required and vital
service. Search and Rescue aircraft were grounded during that period.
Through this incident, it was decided at the Coast Guard Headquarters and
DOT level that this activity was an essential service and for safety
reasons was returned in-house . The billets originally deleted by this
activity when contracted out were returned to the Air Station [6]
.
The other commercial activity that returned in-house was for Food
Service at the Training Center, Petaluma, CA. The contractor was
operating the main base dining facility and losing money through declining
customer levels. The contractor had competition at the Training Center as
many of their customers took the option of dining at the Training Center's
Subsistence Specialist (SS) School Dining Facility. This facility not
only had beginning, but advanced SS students preparing meals, and these
meals were of a much higher quality than the contractor could provide.
There was a mutual agreement between the contractor and the Coast Guard
that the Coast Guard would not exercise another option year in the
contract. The contracted-out activity was then combined with the SS
school dining facility for increased SS training space. In this case, no
additional billets were added to those that were previously deleted from
the base galley as SS's in training were available from the school [28],
Since the Coast Guard began its A-76 reviews in 1985 and through
August 1991, 89 reviews have been completed with just under half (44)
being contracted-out. The combination of contracting-out and in-house
with MEO has resulted in an estimated average annual cost savings of
$28,074,000. These reviews also resulted in a reduction of 813 military
and 324 civilian billets out of 1596 military and 952 civilian billets
reviewed (Table I) [45]. Of the 44 commercial activities contracted-out,
16 were contracted out by open competition and 28 were reserved for 8(a)
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* - Through August 1991
Source: USCG A-76 Report to OMB through 2nd Quarter FY 1990 - May
1990. Updated through August 1991 by COMDT (G-CPP-2)
.
The Coast Guard's A-76 savings are small overall, but comparable on
a per review savings when compared to DOD . From October 1978 to December
1986, DOD conducted 1, 661 completed reviews resulting in an estimated
annual cost savings of $612,557,000, with 801(48 percent) activities
remaining in-house [54:p.l5]. While the Coast Guard's total savings was
4.3 percent of DOD's, the Coast Guard averaged $307,000 in savings per
review where DOD's average was $369,000 per review [52].
C. PROBLEMS WITH A-76
A number of problems have been encountered by both the Department of
Defense (DOD) and Coast Guard in implementing A-76, with some of these
problems continuing today. The DOD has been active in the A-76 review
process much longer than the Coast Guard and many GAO studies have been
made documenting the effectiveness of DOD A-76 activities. The Coast
Guard's A-76 program has not been the subject of a GAO audit, however, the
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Department of Transportation Inspector General (DOT-IG) has reviewed the
Coast Guard A-76 program noting only minor discrepancies [1] . Also, a
Coast Guard in-house study on A-76 effectiveness was conducted in 1989
which noted no major discrepancies in administration of the progrsim [6] .
The GAO believes that the A-76 program is a good way to encourage
effective and efficient Government operation, but the program has not
gained Government-wide acceptance or met its objectives [54:p.l] . The GAO
through its' many studies of A-76 have identified a number of problem
areas with the program.
1
. Management Study Review and Performance Work Statement
The overall management study process is very time consuming and
burdensome. The time requirements for completing the study were also
unrealistic. The GAO found that on average it took DOD two years to
complete each MEO cost study, with some taking up to eight years. DOD
progress on current studies show 44% of the present studies ongoing for 6
or more years [52:p.4]. The DOT-IG review of Coast Guard A-76 activity
found a shorter average review completion time where out of 100 reviews,
only 14 took greater than two years [1] . This could probably be
attributed to the difference in magnitude of DOD reviewed activities over
Coast Guard.
The GAO found that contributing to the problem in conducting the
studies is preparation of the management study, PWS and MEO. At the unit
with the commercial activity reviewed, the study task is given to a person
at the unit as a collateral duty. The 0MB Circular A-76 supplement
discusses the management study as:
...a "team effort" using persons with expertise in
management analysis, staffing, position classification,
work measurement, value engineering, industrial
engineering, cost analysis, contracting, and technical
aspects of the functional effort under study.
[35:p.III-2]
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Usually the person assigned this task does not have the skill or
experience to properly prepare the study (and also he/she may never
prepare one again) . This lack of skill has added time to the completion
of the study, PWS and also the cost determination of the MEO [54:p.3].
The lack of additional skilled personnel to conduct studies was one
of the Coast Guard's excuses for not implementing A-76. OMB granted the
Coast Guard some of its billets requested for A-76 in 1984 and a new Coast
Guard Headquarters staff element COMDT(G-A76) was formed to do the overall
review and all the studies. G-A76 also had most of the personnel
resources mentioned above to conduct the studies. However, G-A76 shifted
the burden of conducting the studies to field units, where the review is
now conducted as a collateral duty by a person without the proper skills
for the job. Presently, the reviewer is only armed with the following:
(1) Supplements to OMB Circular A-76 (1980 and 1983) on how to prepare
management studies; (2) an example of a completed management study for
guidance in completing the review; and (3) COMDT (G-CPP-2) in Washington,
DC is available for questions. This can add to completion time of the
study, and also result in an inaccurate PWS.
For past reviews in the field, the Coast Guard-imposed time deadlines
have pushed the Coast Guard unit for results. This has caused the
reviewer at the unit to rush and ultimately produce an incomplete review.
A past Coast Guard Subsistence Specialist program manager stated that some
initial food service PWS's were vague, with poor quality assurance plans
and discrepancies in some of these studies resulting in poor initial
contracts. However, the learning curve has improved as a result of
earlier errors [41]. ^4LCPAC Contract Specialists also say that while the
PWS's are sometimes incomplete, they are usable with additional inquiry on
their part [ 14 ]
.
The distance between the review sites and study team can be a problem
depending on who conducts the review. The G-A76 review staff in
Washington, DC had all Headquarter' s staff Program Managers available for
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answers or consultation on questions outside the G-A76 staff's area of
expertise, but they were still far away from some of their review sites,
and not being close to the site may also have contributed to incomplete
PWS's. There also seems to have been limited coordination between
Headquarters and the Contract Administrators at MLCPAC in Alameda, CA for
some of the solicitations for Pacific Area contracts placed by
Headquarters
.
2 . Work Force Perception
The work force perception of A-76 may still be a problem [52]
.
Many persons from high levels down to the unit Commanding Officer, may see
the A-76 process as just "contracting-out " one of their functions with a
resulting loss of military or civilian billets. The Commanding Officer
loses flexibility in the use of his personnel as the new contractor is not
an employee, and there can be no employer-employee relationship in this
contract. The contractor may be seen as a short-term tenant providing a
service who can only be communicated with through the Coast Guard'
s
contracting officer many miles away. Persons with this perception aren't
able to accept the effectiveness concept of the MEO, and may also see the
lost billets as a reduction of personnel. The Command reviewing the
function may also take on the review as a competition to be won. The
reviewer may be encouraged to undercut the MEO to such a level where if
the Government "wins", the resulting pared-down organization may be unable
to properly carry out its job, thereby hurting the Command and the
Government
.
3. Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR)
The Contracting Officer' s Technical Representative (COTR) and
Quality Assurance Evaluators (QAE) (that may be assigned to the COTR) for
each service contract, are a vital link to the Coast Guard's contracting
officer in ensuring requirements of the contract are met, but that link
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has the potential to be weak. The military COTR may only be assigned as
the COTR for two to three years and may lack the required experience upon
arrival to the job. The Coast Guard provides training to some of their
COTR' s through one to five day courses conducted by the Office of
Personnel Management, General Services Administration, or a private
contractor, but the present courses are not a substitute for experience
[57] . The COTR assigned may not give his duty the attention it requires
or have the skill to perform adequately. In a past Coast Guard food
service contract, the contractor was giving away "free" breakfasts, by
paying the customer's meal price out of his pocket, and then collecting
the difference between the customer's meal price and the contract meal
cost [41] . A well-prepared COTR would have caught this action or
prevented it from happening.
4
. Cost Increases and Cost Savings Determinations
Many cost increases have occurred in contracted-out activities.
GAO audits of DOD activities show that poorly prepared PWS's with some
tasks omitted have caused items to be added-on to the contract, resulting
in increased costs. A 1985 study by GAO reviewing 20 DOD functions
contracted-out between 1978 and 1981 found that all but one of the
functions had cost increases, but savings were still realized on 17 of the
functions [49:p.l].
The cost savings reported after an A-76 review may not be accurate or
complete. A GAO study released in March 1990 stated that OMB' s figures of
DOD cost savings did not accurately reflect the extent to which economy in
Government operations were being achieved. The report listed the
following problems with DOD procedures [51:p.2-3]
:
• DOD estimates expected cost savings from individual studies on the
basis of standardized assumptions, not on the best available cost
data.
• DOD does not routinely collect and analyze cost information to
monitor actual operations after a cost study has been made.
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• The computerized data base that DOD uses to accumulate information on
expected cost savings contains inaccurate and incomplete information.
• DOD' s automated system miscalculates total annual expected cost
savings
.
• DOD' s system does not contain reliable information on the cost of
implementing DOD' s A-76 program, including the cost of doing the
studies
Based on these problems, GAO stated that neither DOD nor OMB have reliable
information to assess the true savings that are realized [Ref 51 :p. 3].
The Coast Guard has some of the Scime problems as DOD in identifying
A-76 cost savings. Coast Guard cost savings are given as an average
annual cost, which is computed as a difference between the estimate of
what it cost the Coast Guard to operate the activity before taking
personnel reductions, and the cost of the MEO or average annual cost of
the initial contract. Cost increases during the life of the contract are
not used in calculating cost savings. The Coast Guard does not routinely
track A-76 contract cost increases unless there may be a major problem in
performance, and the activity is considered for review to return in-house.
Also the Coast Guard does not take into account the cost of doing the
study, the PWS, or MEO [6] . For these reasons similar to DOD's, the Coast
Guard also may be reporting inaccurate savings information.
5 . Work Force Morale and Productivity
A-76 has been shown to have a bad affect on morale and
productivity. GAO studies have shown that employee concern begins as soon
as an A-7 6 study is announced. Some employees begin looking for other
jobs, reducing their productivity and resulting in loss of good employees.
As the attrition rate increases, managers are required to do more with
less workers, in addition to working on the A-76 study [54:p.5].
A-76 provides a safety net for the affected civilian employee where
the agency is required to exert "maximum effort" to find available
positions for adversely affected employees including [35 :p . 1-18-19]
:
• Giving priority for available position in the agency.
^
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• Have a reemployment priority list and positive placement.
• Pay reasonable costs for training and relocation as they relate
directly with placement.
• Coordinate with Office of Personnel Management to ensure employees
have access to Government -wide placement programs and Department of
Labor for private sector jobs.
• Advise employees that they have right of first refusal for employment
on the contract for positions that they are qualified.
A GAO study of DOD activities in 1985 showed that the majority (74%)
of civilian federal workers whose jobs were contracted-out obtained other
federal employment (with a majority of those persons placed in lower
grades) , 7% went to work for the contractor, 5% were involuntarily
separated, and most of those remaining employees resigned or retired
[50:p.6] . While the Coast Guard Civilian Policy and Programs Division is
concerned over A-76 affects on Coast Guard civilians, they do not
presently compile information on how Coast Guard civilian employees are
affected after a function is contracted-out [42]
.
6 . Affect on Coast Guard Enlisted Ratings
A-76 implementation has had an adverse affect on the billet
structure for some Coast Guard enlisted ratings. Civilian personnel
displaced by a contract may lose their jobs, but military personnel in a
deleted billet usually remain in the service and are transferred into
excess or other positions. The Coast Guard Subsistence Specialist (SS) and
to a lesser degree. Electronics Technician (ET) enlisted ratings have been
severely affected in some areas as a result of contracting-out
.
Of Coast Guard Commercial activities contracted-out, 33 percent of the
military billets reduced were SS related billets [45] . As more SS billets
are deleted, the reassignment to an excess billet is more likely to be a
ship. Contracting-out food service functions have caused shore
assignments for the SS rate to greatly decrease in some areas. In the
Pacific Area, 20 shore units have been contracted-out, raising that
region's SS sea/shore billet rotation ratio to seven-to-one. In the
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concentrated geographic area of Seattle, WA the sea/shore rotation is now
20/1, which has reduced the desire for SS's to remain in this area in
subsequent tours, and will result in increased Permanent Change of Station
(PCS) costs [41] .
Coast Guard A-76 food service contracts have also adversely affected
the SS billet structure. There is a shortage of SS personnel at the E-5
level and advancement has slowed [41]. The current authorized billet
structure and a time in service at time of advancement comparison is shown
in Table II [58] .
TABLE II
USCG SUBSISTENCE SPECIALIST <SS) BILLET STRUCTURE - 1990
Rate Authorized Actual 1984 TIS* 1990 TIS
E-4 396 441 2..40 2.85
E-5 364 278 4,.64 6.50
E-6 278 271 9,.63 9.66
E-7 142 140 15..00 15.60
E-8 28 27 19,.66 20.90
E-9 9 9 22,.71 20.50
* - Average time in service at advancement in years
[Ref 17]
The Subsistence Specialist is a major contributor to high morale on
many Coast Guard Cutters. However, denying shore billet opportunities as
a result of A-76 may have an adverse long term impact on retention of many
good SS's. Advanced SS "C" School students are given a survey during each
entering class and one question asks "What would they do to change the
rate?" The number one response is to reduce the sea-shore rotation [37].
Enrollment at the Coast Guard' s SS "A" School for new cooks is down and
this school is now one of few offered to Coast Guard recruits immediately
after basic training [41] . The reduction of sea-shore rotation cannot be
overcome by cash incentives. The SS Selected Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) has
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a higher bonus base than all but two other Coast Guard ratings, and since
March 1991, a cash bonus of $1,000 has been offered to SS "A" School
graduates and SS "Strikers" [48]. Despite these incentives, SS
recruitment and retention doesn't meet current manning requirements and
the SS rating is the 20th lowest of 23 Coast Guard ratings for first term
reenlistments [46:p.9].
A number of Coast Guard shore electronics maintenance functions have
been contracted-out on a smaller scale than the food service contracts
that have affected SS's, but shore billet opportunities for ET' s have also
been reduced as a result of A-76 actions [58]
.
7. Some Solutions to A—76 Problems
With the SS rate problems brought about in part by A-76, the SS
Program Manager at COMDT (G-PS-2) has developed a USCG Subsistence Program
Action Plan for Headquarters level decision makers. The point paper
presents the objectives of the SS program, addresses SS related problems,
and provides plans to strengthen the SS rate by modifying SS opportunities
ashore, raising the low image of the SS, and improving the SS career path
and training program [39] .
In a move to improve A-76 future actions, COMDT (G-CPP-2) is
coordinating its efforts more closely with the Office of Personnel, Work
Force Planning Division (COMDT (G-PWP) ) in reviewing the effects of future
potential billet deletions. Also, there must now be a multi-mission
impact statement as part of the management study. This statement's
purpose is to assess the impact on the employees affected by the study
[6] .
The pace of Coast Guard A-76 reviews has slowed in the past few years.
There are presently five ongoing commercial activity reviews with 41
remaining from the original inventory to be conducted. The last review of
the Coast Guard A-76 "cycle" is scheduled for MEO or contract
implementation in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1996. Based on the
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existing inventory, 2,245 military and 1,448 civilian positions will have
been reviewed when the "first round" is over [45]
.
With the Coast Guard' s recent commitment to Total Quality Management
(TQM) , and a reduction in the amount of A-76 reviews to be conducted,
COMDT (G-CPP-2) has been tasked to look at various Coast Guard in-house
operations (inside and outside the sphere of A-76) to review and seek
improvement in processes to improve efficiency. Also, the 0MB has reduced
the Coast Guard's incentive to cut billets in its earlier forced billet
reductions. The OMB restored 425 billets to the Coast Guard for 1991 and
plans to restore 162 billets in 1992 [6] . There are still almost 550
Coast Guard billets to cut in order to meet OMB' s original requirements,
but these reductions have been allowed to take place over the next eight
fiscal years. There is also a small possibility that the OMB may restore
additional billets to the Coast Guard in future years depending on the




D. PAST STUDY OF COST INCREASES IN THREE USCG COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
In 1989, LCDR Michael OMATSU, USCG conducted a study of the cause of
cost increases for three different types of A-76 contracted-out commercial
activities in the Coast Guard as his thesis while attending the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. The commercial activities studied
had varying degrees of complexity and were for: Maintenance of
Government -owned housing managed by USCG Base Honolulu, HI; full food
service for USCG Group San Diego, CA; and Security guard service for USCG
Support Center Seattle, WA
.
The thesis discussed contract administration problems experience in
each activity by the Government and the contractor. It also provided the
contract modification history of each contract and identified cost
increases. The conclusions of the study stated that cost increases
experienced in each of the contracts were caused primarily by Department
of Labor wage determination adjustment increases, and in only one
23
situation a cost increase was caused by added work requirements [36: p. 37]
.
The suinmary of commercial activity cost increases found in this thesis
are as follows
:
Base Honolulu Housing Maintenance - $49,021 (over 3 years)
Group San Diego Food Service - $18,099 (over 4 years)
Support Center Seattle Guard Service - $35,458 (over 3 years)
''« In the three commercial activities studied, the researcher found that
there was still an annual savings realized over the MEO despite the cost
increases. With DOL Wage determinations the prime reason for cost
increases, the thesis stated that the Federal wage increases tended to
preserve the cost advantage of the contractor.
How have these contracts evolved since this study, and are they still
cost effective? The first section of the following chapter will provide
an update to LCDR Omatsu's thesis on the cause of cost increases, with the




Ill . STUDY OF COST INCREASES OF CC»1MERCIAL ACTIVITIES
A. UPDATE ON COST INCREASES FOR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OF PAST STUDY
In updating LCDR Omatsu' s study of cost increases for three U.S. Coast
Guard commercial activities, the contract files of the activities located
at MLCPAC Alameda, CA were reviewed to extract modifications and cost
trends. MLCPAC Contract Specialists, contractors, unit Commanding
Officers, and COTR' s were interviewed to discuss contract performance,
determine the reasons for cost increases (if they still occurred) , and to
determine if the cost increases could be avoided. The updated study
period for these activities covers the time from October 1988 through
September 1991.
1 . Base Honolulu Housing Maintenance
This contract is for the maintenance of 292 Coast Guard owned
family housing units on the island of Oahu, Hawaii which is in the
Fourteenth Coast Guard District. An Invitation for Bid (IFB) for this
contract was issued in July 1985 and the contract was awarded to DWS, Inc.
of Scottsdale, AZ who was the lowest responsive and responsible bidder.
The contract value was $1,612,522 for the base and four option years and
went into effect on February 1, 1986. This resulted in the reduction of
11 Government civilian and four military billets. During the contract
period covered by the past study by LCDR Omatsu (December 1985 - March
1989), twelve contract modifications were issued. Since the last study
through May 1991, twelve additional modifications have been incorporated
into the contract and are detailed in Table III. Five of these contract
modifications were required in the fall of 1989 and 1990 because of the
limited Government funding available. Continuing resolutions were passed
by Congress to keep the Government operating because they could not
approve the Government's annual budget. ' ''•
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TABLE III
MODIFICATIONS TO CONTRACT DTCG34-85-B-00119
BASE HONOLULU HOUSING MAINTENANCE, HONOLULU, HI





































709,709 Contract Mods 1-12. Contract
extended through 30SEP89 (3rd
Option Year)
.
Authorization list of persons to
place orders against contract.
725,433 Contract extended 01OCT89 -






741,157 Funds available 01-30NOV89.
Authorization list of persons to
place orders against contract.
898,397 Funds available 01DEC89 -
30SEP90 (4th Option Year FY90
total - $188, 688) .
Negotiated Contract extension
01OCT90 - 31DEC90. DOL Wage
Determination 86-242 03/28/90
(Rev 9) . Increase incorporated.
909,257 Limited Government funds
available 01-09OCT90 (Continuing
Resolution)
926,905 Funds available 10-24OCT90
930,977 Funds available 25-31OCT90
1,047,725 Contract extended 01NOV90 -
28FEB91.
1,137,323 Contract extended 01MAR91 -
31MAY91.
1,256,787 Contract extended 01JUN91 -
30SEP91 (Contract extension FY91
total - $358,390)
.
Source: Contract file for Base Honolulu Housing Maintenance, Contract
Number DTCG34-85-B-00119, located at Maintenance and Logistics Command,
Pacific, Alouneda, CA.
The contract moved into an extension period after the original base
and four option year period ended September 30, 1990. The extension was
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required when it was decided that the contract's scope was to be expanded
to consolidate contracts covering services on other contracts. The new
contract's additional services now include landscaping, janitorial, and
pest control. Prior to the expiration of the initial contract, the first
extension was negotiated and planned for three months, but due to
excessive delays in the development of specifications, solicitation, and
contract award, the contract was extended through September 30, 1991.
For the life of this contract, both the customers and contractor have
generally been satisfied. However, the following problem areas were
addressed by both parties, with the majority of these problems volunteered
and noted by the Government's representatives:
• Some of the past contract specifications were too vague and open to
interpretation. (Seen as a problem by both parties)
• The distance between MLCPAC and Base Honolulu created a
communications problem. The Contract specialist was sometimes slow
to respond to inquiries about the contract from the COTR (attributed
to MLCPAC workload) [3]
.
• Base Honolulu personnel feel they have very little control in this
contract. The present Housing Officer notes that the contractor has
been "running the Coast Guard" where for example. Quality Assurance
(QA) was not followed up by the COTR, and the COTR would take the
word of contractor that work was completed [27]
.
• The new Housing Officer perceives that the COTR may be too close to
the contractor outside the working environment to have a proper
professional relationship. He cited the COTR' s QA reliance on the
contractor as an exaimple [27] .
• The Contractor doesn't have their own administrative support, and
uses Coast Guard supplies for some administrative needs. No
compensation given for its' use [27].
• The COTR has been on the job for six years and has received COTR
training in three courses, but he believed the training was not
totally adequate to cover real-life aspects of COTR duties [3].
• Past Housing Officers at Base Honolulu have had little experience,
upon arrival, in contract administration and have relied solely on
OJT. This lack of experience and the long distance to MLCPAC may
have resulted in minimal direction to the COTR on how to effectively
manage the contract for the contracting officer. A past Housing
Officer has directed the COTR to not make recommendations to the
Contracting Officer in MLCPAC concerning contract conflicts, when the
COTR is supposed to be the eyes and ears of the Contracting Officer
[3].
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The Contract Specialist at MLCPAC Alameda perceives that there are no
problems with the contractor or the COTR, and many of these previously
listed minor and some potentially major problems at the unit level were
not noticed by her. This could be because of her primary reliance on
letter and telephone correspondence for communications with and feedback
from the customer, COTR, and contractor [2]
.
The new expanded contract is pending award approval by the COMDT (G-
CCS) (Chief of Staff review and approval is required for contracts greater
than one million dollars) and is scheduled to go into effect on October 1,
1991. The new contract's base year value is $874,688. The housing
maintenance costs are provided as separate line items in the new contract,
however, it may be difficult to track cost increases and measure cost
effectiveness in the housing maintenance service area. The MLCPAC
Contract Specialist for this contract anticipates that this may become a
problem when the Coast Guard' s labor intensive and complex quality
assurance plan is implemented [43].
Cost increases in
this contract came
from two sources . The
first source was the ^
cost increases from
Department of Labor
( D O L ) Wage
Determinations from
the first study period
which carried over
into the last two ^
TABLE IV
COST INCREASES TO CONTRACT PRICE
BASE HONOLULU HOUSING MAINTENTANCE
01OCT88-30SEP91
Option Year 3: 01OCT88-30SEP89
Wage Increases: $20,688





option years of the contract. The second source camxe from the end of the
contract extension, which resulted in a significant cost increase. In
option years three and four, the same Department of Labor (DOL) wage
determination incorporated into option years one and two were used, with
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no other wage increases taken. In the present extension period, a DOL
wage determination was incorporated which almost doubled the cost of
contract performance. In addition, the cost of the negotiated extension
was increased to compensate the contractor for wage increases not taken
(but available) in the last three option years. The new contract
extension price was determined to be fair and reasonable by MLCPAC . Cost
increases for this contract are summarized in Table IV.
Wage increases are the driving factor for increased costs in this
contract. The only way to cut costs in this contract is to reduce the
requirements. This is unlikely in the near future since housing
maintenance needs have increased and the new consolidated contract has
been established [2] .
2 . Group San Diego Food Service
This contract is for the operation of the dining facility at the
U.S. Coast Guard Group in San Diego, CA. This dining facility's customers
included not only Group personnel, but the personnel of the Air Station,
Station (Small Boat) San Diego, Patrol Boats, and a Reserve Group unit
(when on active duty) . There have been two contracts awarded for this
commercial activity since it was initially contracted-out.
The initial contract was awarded to Aleman Food Service of San
Antonio, TX under the SEA 8 (a) set-aside prograun. This first contract was
effective on June 1, 1985 for a four month base year and four option years
at an estimated contract price of $1,378,200 ($106,200 Base year plus
$318,060 per option year) . The contractor displaced seven military
billets when this contract became effective. The Government and
contractor were both very satisfied with the performance of this contract
with no deductions taken for unsatisfactory performance. In the first
contract, wage increases were incorporated during three of the contract
option years totaling $18,089, however at the end of each fiscal year, a
deobligation of funds was taken which totaled $76,906. This reduction
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made the overall price of the first contract less than the original
estimate
.
A deobligation of funds for a food service contract can counterbalance
any wage increases. A deobligation occurs when the actual costs of
performance in a contract are below the original estimated cost. Excess
obligated funds from this contract account are then transferred to cover
other accounts that may be experiencing cost overruns, for future
unplanned contingency obligations, or for expenditures on material not
funded in the original budget [26] . In this case, the actual meals sold
were below the original estimate of meals to be sold (based on past
history) . In food service contracts, each type of meal is priced based on
a range of the number of meals sold each month, with a higher price per
meal for a low number and a lower price per meal for a high number of
meals sold. This is done to cover contractor costs and also to accomodate
the fixed price contract. For example, if the number of meals sold during
contract performance increases and moves to a higher range, the meal
prices are reduced. In this contract, the number of meals sold have been
decreasing, therefore meal prices increased. However, the number of meals
sold in this contract have decreased to a point where they are below the
lowest amount /highest price range, and the amount entitled to the
contractor is less than originally obligated at the beginning of the
option year (based on confirmation by the COTR through monthly invoices)
.
When this occurs, a funds deobligation takes place.
Aleman Food Services graduated from the SBA 8 (a) program at the end
of their final option year in 1989, and another 8(a) contractor was
recommended by the SBA for this contract. The present contract was
awarded to Ballantine' s South Bay Caterer of San Diego, and became
effective on October 1, 1989. This contract was for $385,500 in the base
year with four option years totaling $1,927,500. As of September 1991,
there have been 15 modifications to this contract which are outlined in
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Table V. Six of these modifications were required as a result of
Congressional continuing resolutions for temporary Government funding.
TABLE V
MODIFICATIONS TO CONTRACT DTCG89-90-C-70013
USCG GROUP SAN DIEGO FOOD SERVICE, SAN DIEGO, CA








2 01NOV89 32,125 64,250
3 01DEC89 312,250 385,500
4 23MAY90
5
















32,125 Limited Government funds
available 01-31OCT8^ (Continuing
Resolution) . (New contract
begins. Base Year - $385,000)
Funds available 01-30NOV89
Funds available 01DEC89 -
30SEP90
PWS Change - Meal time change
PWS Change - Meal time change
Deobligation of funds
Contract extended 01OCT89-
30SEP90. (Base Year ends - FY90
total - $313,950) DOL Wage
Determination 88-217 07/20/89
(Rev 4) . No increase requested
322,240 Funds available 01-10OCT90
Change of address
335,712 Funds available 11-24OCT90
346,075 Funds available 25-31OCT90
699,450 Funds available 01NOV90 -
30SEP91
701,056 Consumer Foods Price Index 5%
price increase adjustment
Contract extended 01OCT91 -
30SEP92
614,469 Deobligation of funds (1st
Option Year total - $300,519)
Source: Contract file for Group San Diego Food Service, Contract
Number DTCG89-90-C-70013, located at Maintenance and Logistics Command,
Pacific, Alameda, CA.
As in the previous contract, performance is seen as very satisfactory
by the Government, with no major problems and no deductions taken for
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unsatisfactory performance. The COTR for this activity, a Chief
Subsistence Specialist (SSC) who is also the Group' s Exchange Officer, has
been assigned to his duties since 1987. He has attended Navy QA training
in San Diego and feels that it did not help him in his COTR duties [Ic]
.
Mr. Tony Javier, the contractor's Project Manager (PM) , is a major
reason for the success of this contract. Mr. Javier is a retired USCG
Master Chief Subsistence Specialist (SSCM) who worked at the Group dining
facility when it was established in 1975 and again just prior to his
retirement from the Coast Guard. Upon retirement, he was hired to serve
as the PM of the Group San Diego dining facility by Aleman Food Service.
He continued on as the PM for the present contractor. Both the Group
personnel and the contractor recognize that Mr. Javier's past experience
and expertise have been a key factor in maintaining a high quality dining
facility. The transition between contractors was virtually invisible to
the Group with Mr. Javier retained as the PM [29,30]
.
Cost increases for this contract have come from two areas. First, an
increase from the past TABLE VI
contract was COST INCREASES TO CONTRACT PRICE
GROUP SAN DIEGO FOOD SERVICE
experienced with the 01OCT89-30SEP91
award of the present ' ' ' i wpiw^»^p^w—w^ i in, . li—^mw^h^w^p^^ww^^
contract, where there Base Year; 01OCT89-30SEP90
is a difference of Deobligation: ($71,550)
$67,440 a year (or Option Year 1: 01OCT90-30SEP91
$337,200 for the Consumer Food Price Increases: $1,556
entire contract) from Deobligation: ($86,587)
the original A-76 i ' ' nwmmmmmm^mm^mmmmimmm^-''mm^m^m^m^^^^^^m^^mt
contract with Aleman Food Service. The only other increase in the present
contract Ccime from an economic price increase for food in Mod 13 which was
for $1,556.
Even with the increased contract cost, there have been deobligations
in the contract due to a reduced number of meals served. These
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deobligations have offset the cost increases. In 1990, there was a
$71,550 decrease (Mod 6) which made the base year obligation only
$313,950. In 1991, there was a $86,587 decrease (Mod 15) which made the
first option year obligation only $300,519. Both of these amounts are
less than the annual amounts initially obligated for any of the option
years in the previous contract. These cost increases are summarized in
Table VI.
Two potential problems the contractor is facing may have an affect on
the costs of future option years. The continued declining meal sales may
bring costs down, however this may be partially offset by future wage
increases that the PM believes should occur because the other contract
Government dining facilities in the San Diego area receive higher wages
than the Coast Guard's contractor-run facility [24] .
3. Support Center Seattle Security
This commercial activity contract was for protection of the Coast
Guard Support Center in Seattle, WA, which has an area of 15 acres with
waterfront and 15 tenant commands. The contract for this activity was
awarded to Professional Services Unlimited of Tacoma, WA by negotiations
through the SBA 8 (a) program. This contract displaced five civilian
Government billets when it went into effect on October 1, 1985 for a base
year and four option years at a total price of $1,044,287. The annual
contract price was reduced by $89,060 in the 2nd option year when the
nxomber of guards required for the contract was reduced by one, and the
requirement for a vehicle was deleted (effective January 1, 1987) . In the
past study (October 1985 - October 1988) eleven modifications were issued
to the contract. Since October 1, 1988, twelve modifications have been
issued (11-23) which included a contract extension of six months. The
contract modifications are provided in Table VII. Five of these
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17 01OCT90 2,489 747,797
18 9OCT90 4,041 751,841
19 22OCT90 3,111 754,952
20 16NOV90 28,930 744,882
21 17JAN90 9,643 784,525
22 08FEB91 6,657 791,183
Obligation from Contract Base
and 1st and 2nd Option Year.
Contract extended 01OCT88 -
30SEP89 (3rd Option Year)
Funds deobligated from contract.
Corrected error from Mod 11.
(3rd Option Year - FY89 total -
$115,720) .
Contract extended 01OCT8 9 -
30SEP90 (4th Option Year)
.
Government Funds available 01-
310CT89 (Continuing Resolution)
.
DOL Wage Determination 87-862
09/19/88 (Rev 1) . No increase
requested.
Funds available 01-30NOV89.




Year - FY90 total - $115,924)
DOL Wage Determination 87-862








Contract extended 01NOV90 -
31JAN91.
Contract extended 01FEB91 -
29FEB91
.
Additional Security Guard for
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23 01MAR91 19,471 (10,655 Contract extended 01-31MAR91
(Contract extension - FY91 total
(6 Months) - $65,346)
.
New contract negotiated with












Source: Contract file for Support Center Seattle Security, Contract
Number DTCG33-85-R-01862, located at Maintenance and Logistics Command,
Pacific, Alameda, CA.
The new contract was awarded through negotiations with the same contractor
and became effective on March 28, 1991. The base and four option years
contract value was $709,010. The six month extension of the original
contract was required during extended negotiations for the new contract.
The delay in contract award was caused primarily by the Government due to
extended negotiation preparations and time for the DCAA audit of the
contractor's proposal [8].
The contractor has performed satisfactorily throughout the previous
contract period with the new award of the contract as evidence of
acceptable performance. The only deduction for unsatisfactory performance
occurred when $446 was deducted in May 1990 for 14 "minor discrepancies".
However, it is not known if this amount was deducted from the contractor's
payments since it is not reflected in the contract file. The USCG
Contract Specialist for this contract stated that the specifications of
the old contract were satisfactory but that the new contract was an
improvement with a better defined scope of work [8]
.
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The COTR for this contract is a LTJG who has been assigned to the
Support Center for just over four months. He has not been a COTR before
and has requested COTR training from MLCPAC . He was debriefed by the
prior COTR and is not aware of any major problems in contract performance
[21].
Cost increases in
this contract during TABLE VIII
the period of this COST INCREASES TO CONTRACT PRICE
SUPPORT CENTER SEATTLE GUARD SERVICE
study came from two 01OCT88-31MAR91
sources. DOL wage
determinations Option Year 3: 01OCT88-30SEP89
incorporated in the Wage Increase: $1,994
last study period in Option Year 4: 01OCT89-30SEP90
the base and option Wage Increase: $1,994
years one and two Contract Extension: 01OCT90-31MAR91
carried over into Wage Increase: $997
option year three. Increased Work: $6,657
(Additional Guard)
four, and the six
month extension
($1, 994/year, $4985 total) . The other source of cost increase came during
Operation Desert Storm. In February 1991, an additional guard was added
to upgrade the security of the Support Center for 1.5 months ($6,657)
.
The most recent DOL wage determination was also incorporated in the cost
for the increased guard requirement. These cost increases are summarized
in Table VIII. While conducting the research on this contract, the
contractor declined to be interviewed.
Costs in this contract can only be decreased with a reduction in the
number of personnel required for security. However, a new requirement is
under consideration by the Support Center for the guards to carry
firearms. The possibility of this future requirement is addressed in the
new contract, and if incorporated, will increase contract costs.
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B. STUDY OF THREE ADDITIONAL C(»1MERCIAL ACTIVITIES
Along with updating the study of the three commercial activities
analyzed in LCDR Omatsu's thesis, this researcher analyzed three
additional commercial activities that were contracted-out under OMB
Circular A-76. The criteria for selection of the three contracts were:
• Pacific Area contracts to observe the same contract administration as
in the previously studied contracts
• Similarity to the complexity of the contracts in the previous study
• Contracts that had deleted billets of the rate most severely affected
by A-76 (Subsistence Specialists (SS)
)
• Commercial activities in high cost areas that may be difficult to
support
• Mature (completed) and current (ongoing) contracts
The three commercial activities that were chosen for this segment of the
study were the Support Center Kodiak Food Service, Base Ketchikan Food
Service, and Support Center Alameda Security Service.
1 . Support Center Kodiak Food Service
The Coast Guard Support Center in Kodiak, Alaska is the Coast
Guard's largest shore facility in the Pacific Area. With this facility on
a semi-remote island in South Central Alaska, it is close to the end of
the Coast Guard's logistics chain. Outside support to the facility can
easily be disrupted by severe weather experienced frequently throughout
the year. Also shipments of major machinery and equipment can only be
delivered by sea through the use of tug and barge or container ship [7]
.
The Support Center is home to the Coast Guard' s largest Air Station
which is heavily involved in Alaska Fisheries patrol and Search and Rescue
missions. Other major units with personnel at the Support Center include
two Medium Endurance Cutters, two Buoy Tenders, a large Communications
Station, and a Loran Station.
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The Support Center has a large dining facility which has a customer
base of almost 80 officers and 700 enlisted personnel. The Coast Guard
operated this facility with 20 personnel.
COMDT(G-A76) coordinated the study of this facility and 25 other food
service activities in the summer of 1985, and on November 12, 1985, they
developed a combined Most Efficient Organization and determined the
overall cost savings for these activities. The SBA recommended
Diversified Contract Services of Oakland, CA as an SBA 8 (a) contractor
available for the contract. Negotiations were conducted by Coast Guard
Headquarters and the contract was awarded and in effect on January 1, 1986
for a base year of $576,759 and a total contract price of $3,861,000.
This contract deleted all but one of the SS billets at the dining facility
with the senior SS remaining as the COTR. The original contract was
extended for 1.5 months after the end of the fourth option year while
awaiting the new contract award. Over the life of this contract, there
were twenty-four modifications which are summarized in Table IX. Six of
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Contract in effect 01JAN86.




MODIFICATIONS TO CONTRACT DTCG35-86-C-60011
SUPPORT CENTER KODIAK FOOD SERVICE, KODIAK, AK







01OCT86 576,759 576,759 End of Base Year (FY86 estimated
total $576,759) . Economic price
adjustment . DOL Wage
Determination 88-1158 12/5/85.






5 06NOV87 54,602 1,490,884
6 01DEC87 128,168 1,619,052
7 01FEB88 528,056 2,147,108
8 16JUN88 85,228 2,232,336
9 01OCT88 854,000 3,086,336
10 01OCT88
11 20JAN89 18,864 3,105,200
12 19JUN89
13 01JUN89
Contract extended 01OCT86 -




from 17th District, Juneau, AK
to MLCPAC, Alameda, CA.
Contract extended 01OCT87 -
30SEP88 (2nd Option Year)
.
Limited Government Funds




for 01OCT86 - 30SEP87.
Funds available 01DEC87 -
31JAN88.
Funds available 01FEB88 -
30SEP88
Economic Price Adjustment.
Unionized 01OCT87. (2nd Option
Year - FY 88 total $869,620)
Contract extended 01OCT88 -
30SEP89 (3rd Option Year)
Economic Price Adjustment.
New prices per meal.
Brimfrost '89 exercise meals.
IRS tax levy. Contractor was
not paying taxes to IRS.
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20 01OCT90 15,484 3,635,517
21 10OCT90 25,162 3,660,679
22 30OCT90 19,355 3,680,034
23 01NOV90 30,000 3,710,034
24 19NOV90 (88,835) 3,621,199
PACEX Food - $119,588 - outside
scope of original contract
.
(Third Option Year - Fy89 total
$733,705*)
.
* $139,159 not recorded as
deobligated in contract record
Contract extended 01OCT8 9 -
30SEP90. Limited Government
funds available 01-30OCT89
(Continuing Resolution) . DOL
Wage Determination 87-110
09/18/87 (Rev 1) . No increase
requested.
Funds available 01-30NOV89
Funds available 01DEC8 9 -
30SEP90
Deobligate excess funds (4th




DOL Wage Determination 87-1170










extension cost - $1,164).
New contract award for same
contractor won through small
business competition.
New Contract Base Year 16NOV90 -
30SEP91 for $572,219 (686,663/
Year - $3,318,871 total)
Source: Contract file for Support Center Kodiak Food Service, Contract
Number DTCG35-86-C-60011, located at Maintenance and Logistics Command,
Pacific, Alcimeda, CA.
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Performance of this contract had been satisfactory with no deductions
taken for unsatisfactory performance, however, the COTR recommended
deductions in the past, and also stated that recent customer satisfaction
was below average, and the number of meals sold by the contractor was
declining [12] . The present COTR for the contract is a SSC who has been
at Kodiak for two years, and in his previous assignment was the COTR for
a food service contract at the Coast Guard's Aviation Training Center in
Mobile, AL. He is probably one of the better trained COTR' s in the Coast
Guard because of his past experience and has attended various COTR and QA
training on four occasions. The COTR feels that he is adequately prepared
to perform his COTR duties.
The Deputy Comptroller of the Support Center, who has been at Kodiak
since the dining facility was contracted-out, had mixed comments on the
contractor's performance, but feels that the meal quality is better than
when the facility was run by the Coast Guard [15]
.
The contractor's contract specialist stated that the contract worked
well and was a smooth operation, even though the company experienced
severe financial difficulties during the third option year [13]. In June
1989, the contractor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and began a court
supervised reorganization. During this period, contract payments were
being sent directly to the Internal Revenue Service until the contractor
obtained new creditors. While the food service was not affected by these
problems, there was one major effect of the Chapter 11 reorganization on
the Support Center. The contractor was authorized to purchase some food
items from the Coast Guard commissary on credit. At the time of filing
for restructuring under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy law, the contractor
ran up a food bill of $75,000, which has not been paid back to date [7]
.
The contractor may now only purchase food at the commissary at much
smaller quantities and on a cash basis only.
One problem area in this contract is the specifications. They were
seen as ambiguous in some areas, and in the past, it was perceived that
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the contractor would take advantage of the ambiguities. They did this by
negotiating higher than the original contract meal prices for additional
work that should have been within the scope of work in the original
contract. This added work was for "exercise meals" that resulted from
various large military readiness exercises that involve personnel from the
Support Center and the Air Station, as well as many transient personnel
from Coast Guard Reserve units and other military Services [12]
.
The contractor's supervisory personnel on this contract changed
frequently. The PM has changed three times during this contract, but the
"line" workers employed by the contractor are familiar faces as many are
dependents of Coast Guard personnel assigned to the Support Center [7,15] .
Contract administration of this contract was conducted by the
Seventeenth Coast Guard District (D17) in Juneau, AK from January 1, 1986
to October 1, 1987, and then the contract moved to the newly organized
MLCPAC Alameda, CA., when the Coast Guard reorganized and consolidated
Pacific Area contract support functions. When MLCPAC received control of
D17's contracts just prior to the end of FY87, the head of MLCPAC s
Contract Section commented that the contracts administered by D17
contained little documentation, seemed to be based on verbal and handshake
agreements, and that his contract specialists had to patch-up those
contracts as best they could to keep them running [16]
.
Cost increases in this contract caime from wage increases and
additional exercise meals. However, end of the year deobligations due to
declining meals sold kept the overall contract price below the original
estimate. Under D17 contract administration, it cannot be determined from
the contract record if a wage increase was requested by the contractor and
authorized by the Government. After the change of contract administration
to MLCPAC, the first increase was an equitable adjustment in wages while
under D17 administration for $54,602 in November 1987 (Mod 5) . The next
increase came from a settlement for higher wages after the contractor's
employees unionized. The contractor's employees became unionized on
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October 1, 1987, but the cost increase was not settled until June 18, 1988
for $88,228 (Mod 8) . In January and June 1989, "exercise meals" caused an
increase of $18,864 (Mod 11) and $119,588 (Mod 14) respectively. In the
contract file, the amount for Mod 14 was not added as a cost to the
contract because the work was deemed to be outside the scope of the
original contract and was subject to a separate negotiation, however, this
was added work that required additional funds.
During option year





COST INCREASES TO CONTRACT PRICE
SUPPORT CENTER KODIAK FOOD SERVICE
01JAN86-15NOV90
' Base Year: 01 JAN86-30SEP86
Increase: None
Option Year 1: 01OCT86-30SEP87
Increase: None
Option Year 2: 01OCT87-30SEP88
Wage Increase: $54,602
Wage Increase: $85,228
Option Year 3: 01OCT88-30SEP89
Exercise Meals: $18,864
Deobligation: ($139,159)






period resulted in a
$139,159 difference.
This gap could not be
explained by MLCPAC,
however it is possible
that this difference
could have been a
deobligation not
recorded as the number
of meals sold were
declining during this
period.
In the fourth option year, a large deobligation took place at the end
of the fiscal year for $200,000 (Mod 18) because the number of meals sold
continued to decline. This decline in the number of meals sold during
this contract could be attributed to a niomber of sources. First there are
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two alternate sources for meals at the Support Center. The new "Golden
Anchor" is a large Coast Guard operated club/restaurant which opened in
1986 and has experienced increased popularity. Across the street from the
dining facility is a fast food snack bar located in the new
exchange/commissary complex. A second factor was the awarding of the Base
Operating Support Services (BOSS) contract for the Support Center in June
of 1988. When this A-76 contract was awarded, 96 civilian and 105
military billets were deleted, greatly reducing the customer base of the
dining facility [45].
The contract extension was negotiated at a reduced rate from the
previous year's obligation ($60, 000/month vs. $71, 167/month) , however, the
end of the extension period deobligation of $88,835 resulted in an
extension cost of only $1,164. It is not clear in the contract file why
this 1.5 month contract cost was so low. A Summary of contract cost
increases are outlined in Table X.
Diversified Contract Services graduated from the SBA 8 (a) program at
the end of this contract, and MLCPAC with SBA' s assistance decided that
there were enough contractors to hold a small business competition for the
new contract. Eleven contractors submitted bids for the contract.
Diversified was the third lowest bidder, but the two lower bidders were
determined to be non-responsible, and Diversified won the award. The
present contact is for $686,663 a year with a base year of 10.5 months and
a total contract value of $3,318,871. The small business competition for
this service contract has driven down the contract cost to a price lower
than the previous contract final cost by $47, 065/year
.
For the future of this commercial activity, the Support Center's
Commanding Officer is concerned with possible cost increases and even more
concerned about the contractor's financial condition. If the contractor
defaults on the contract, there aren't enough Coast Guard SS's available
in Alaska to perform in place of the contractor [7] . The contractor,
under new ownership, is considered to be much more stable than they were
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in 1989, and they presently have eight other Government food service
contracts [9,13] . Future cost increases in this contract may come from
wage and food price increases, but the increase may be offset if the meal
rate is reduced.
2. Base Ketchikan Food Service
This Coast Guard Base located in Ketchikan, Alaska, is an
operating base that also has the 17th Coast Guard District's only Group
unit. The Group's operational area of responsibility encompasses all of
the Alaskan panhandle or "Southeast Alaska". In addition to Group
personnel, the Base contains an industrial facility for buoy maintenance
and Patrol & Small boat overhaul and repair. Tenant commands include a
small boat station, 180 Ft Buoy Tender, and 110 Ft Patrol Boat.
In late 1984, it was determined by COMDT(G-A76) that the Base's dining
facility would be contracted out and an SBA 8 (a) contractor. Big Boy
Facilities, Inc., in Anchorage, Alaska was recommended by the SBA. This
was the first of two SBA 8(a) contractors to perform on this contract.
In the first contract, negotiations were conducted during the Summer
of 1985 by the 17th Coast Guard District with Big Boy Facilities, Inc.
The contract went into effect on October 1, 1985 with a contract price of
$307,132 a year for the base and four option years. The total contract
price was $1,535,660. When effective, this contract deleted six junior SS
billets with the SSC and SSI billets remaining. The SSC was assigned as
the COTR for the contract, and the SSI was the Assistant Exchange Petty
Officer and Club Manager. Contract administration was initially conducted
by the 17th Coast Guard District from October 1, 1985 through October 1,
1987. MLCPAC Alameda, CA took over contract administration from October
1, 1987 to present. Twenty-one contract modifications were incorporated
into this contract and are summarized in Table XI. Six of the
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1 31DEC85 (17,302) 289,830* Inventory credit for provisions
on hand. Funds available for
Base Year of contract 01OCT85-














based on Post Negotiation
Memorandum in contract file)
.
Price of meals
New Performance Work Statement
255,263 Deobligation of funds from
contract (decrease in meals
served)
.
DOL Wage Determination 85-1158
12/05/85 - 8.63% increase
requested. Economic price
adjustment for food - 1.15%
increase requested.
255,623 Additional estimated
deobligation not recorded in
contract file
255, 943 Claim for fire daimage
End of Base Year - FY86
estimated costs - $255, 943
570,616 Contract extended 01OCT86 -
30SEP87 (1st Option Year)
.
570,746 Claim for damage - broken water
pipe.
Estimated deobligation not
recorded in contract file
(End of 1st Option Year - FY87
costs - $281,105)
620, 697 Contract Administration change
from 17th District, Juneau, AK
to MLCPAC, Alameda, CA.
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826,794 Funds available 01AUG88 -
30SEP88. (2nd Option Year - FY
88 total $256,048)
1,133,926 Contract extended 01OCT88 -
30SEP89 (3rd Option Year) . DOL
Wage Determination 86-413
06/29/87 (Rev 3) . Increase
taken in Mod 10.
1,164,334 Economic Price Adjustment for
food. New prices per meal. DOL
Wage Determination increase
applied.
(End 3rd Option Year - FY89
total - $337,539)
1,188,667 Contract extended 01OCT89 -





1,213,000 Funds available 01-30NOV89.
1,456,333 Funds available 01DEC89 -
30SEP90.
DOL Wage Determination 86-483
02/27/89 (Rev 4) . Increase
requested (End 4th Option Year -
FY90 total - $292,000).




1,475,302 Funds available 10-24OCT90
1,483,431 Funds available 25-31OCT90
1,567,431 Contract extended through
31JAN91.
1,623,431 Contract extended 01FEB91-
31MAR91





MODIFICATIONS TO CONTRACT DTCG35-85-C-50090
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MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS COMMAND, PACIFIC
MOD AMOUNT OF CONTRACT
NO. DATE INCREASE TOTAL REMARKS
21 08JUL91 18,497 1,641,928 Adjustment to settle contract.
Contractor graduated from 8 (a)
program (Contract extension Fy91
total - $185,594). New contract
began 15APR91 with 8 (a) firm E&S
Diversified Services.
New contract costs:
Base Year (5. 5 Months) $190,449




Source: Contract file for Base Ketchikan Food Service, Contract Number
DTCG35-85-C-50090, located at Maintenance and Logistics Command, Pacific,
Alameda, CA.
Performance of this contract has been determined to be satisfactory
to excellent by the Government and contractor over the life of this
contract, with no deductions taken for unsatisfactory performance.
However, this contract had a difficult beginning [8,18,20,23,31].
According to the present contract Project Manager (PM) , Mr. Joe
Griffin, the first four months of the contract were extremely difficult.
Mr. Griffin retired from the Coast Guard in Ketchikan as a First Class SS
and was hired by the contractor as Head Cook for the new contract.
Apparently, the first PM hired did not have the experience to operate a
dining facility for military customers. He tried to operate the facility
like a commercial restaurant with little success. The contractor replaced
the original PM with Mr. Griffin, and operations greatly improved as the
new PM was better able to relate to his Coast Guard customers [5,18]. In
this case as in the San Diego Food service contract, the PM being a
motivated prior service SS was a big factor in the success of a contract
operation.
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Another difficult area experienced by the contractor occurred in the
first two years of contract performance when wages and food prices
increased, but the contractor wasn't afforded the opportunity to request
an increase in the contract until the second option year. It is not known
why this occurred [16].
The relationship between the contractor and his customers has been
very good [23] . The COTR for this contract was reassigned after this
contract ended and was not interviewed concerning the contractor's
performance. The alternate COTR is now the COTR for the present contract.
He confirmed that there was a good working relationship between the
contractor and customer. The present COTR has attended one week of COTR
training held by GSA. He stated that the training was a good basic course
in contract fundeimentals, but that QA paperwork requirements were still a
gray area [38 ]
.
The contractor had been "flexible" many times during contract
performance due to the broad specifications in the contract. The
contractor has on occasion allowed the Base to purchase food from them at
cost for special morale events, and has provided assistance in setting up
[5]. The contractor acknowledged that the flexibility available in this
contact was due to the good profit margin negotiated in this 8 (a)
contract, and the "little extra's" could be allowed in this food service
contract without placing claims for extra work [20]
.
The major cost increases during this contract did not occur until
after the first two years of performance when the contract administration
was shifted to MLCPAC in Alaoneda, CA. In the contract file under the 17th
District (D17) contract administration, documentation of actions were
limited and actions taken during this period of the contract are difficult
to reconstruct. A post negotiation memorandum in the contract file
provided the negotiated price of $307,132 a year, however the contract
file did not docxament what amount was actually obligated for the base and
first option year. During the first two years of contract performance.
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D17 allowed two claims for damage totaling $450. There were also two
decreases in contract price in the first two years. The first decrease
was a credit of $17,302 for provisions on hand transferred to the
contractor when the contract began. This credit was given three months
after the contract began. There was also a total estimated deobligation
of $60,364 made for reduced meals sold. These decreases caused the actual
contract price to be well below the original estimate in the base and
option years. The lack of documentation in this contract through D17
contract administration was similar to that experienced in the Support
Center Kodiak food service contract.
Under MLCPAC contract administration, the DOL wage determination
increase was applied and combined with an economic price adjustment for
food totaling $30,407 (Mod 10) . The contractor related that he had
applied for adjustments during the first years of the contract and was
pleased when this adjustment was finally made. Again, the contractor's
"good" profit margin and flexibility in the contract were given as his
reasons not to pursue a claim [20]. Under MLCPAC administration in the
2nd and 4th option years, $256,048 and $292,000 respectively were
obligated and the original price for all contract options of $307, 132 was
not used. However, this amount was obligated during the 3rd option year.
The MLCPAC Contracting Officer and Contract Specialist couldn't recall the
reason for the decreased original obligation. However, it is possible
that these option years were re-negotiated at a lower cost due to
declining meals sold in the past. The contract went into a six month
extension while the Statement of Work was being revised for the new
contract. This extension, with a wage determination increase incorporated
resulted in an increase of $19,223. A summary of Cost increases are
provided in Table XII.
When Big Boy Facilities, Inc. graduated from the SBA 8(a) program, a
new contractor, E&S Diversified Services of Anchorage, AK, was recommended
by the SBA for the contract. The new contract was negotiated and became
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effective on April 15,
1991 with a base and
TABLE XII
COST INCREASES TO CONTRACT PRICE
four option years BASE KETCHIKAN FOOD SERVICE
01OCT85-15APR91
totaling $1,810,272.
This is an average of
$403,808 per year. inventory Credit : ($17,302)
Mr. Griffin was hired Deobligation
:
^^^^'ItVClaim for Fire Damage: $320
Option Year 1: 01OCT86-30SEP87
Base Year: 01OCT85-30SEP896
by the present
contractor as the PM
, . ^ , ^,-,„Claim for damage: $130
,,u;^v, ^^^^ *-u^ ^v,o,,^^ Estimated Deobligation: ($26,157)which made the change s \^ ^ /
f ^4. Option Year 2: 01OCT87-30SEP88of contractors ^^ — —=-: —=^-^






occur if the number of
. ^^ , . ,Difference between contract price and amount
meals sold decreases obligated: ($15,132)
Option Year 3: 01OCT88-30SEP89
Wage and Food Price Increase: $30,407
Option Year 4: 01OCT89-30SEP90
from the original Contract Extension: 01OCT90-14APR91
estimate, however, ^^9^ Increase: $19,233
wage and food price
increases are expected
to continue [8].
3 . Suppozrt Center Alameda Security
This relatively new contract is for security guard services for
the Coast Guard Support Center on Government Island in Alameda, CA. The
Support Center island complex has one entrance via a bridge and is the
home of many major Coast Guard commands. These include the Coast Guard
Pacific Area Headquarters, the Maintenance and Logistics Command, Joint
Task Group Five, and four 378-foot High Endurance Cutters. The
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solicitation for this contract was an IFB set-aside for small business.
The lowest responsible bidder was United International Investigative
Services of Anaheim, CA. When the MEO comparison was conducted by
COMDT (G-CPE-4) in June 1989, the contractor's bid was low, and the
contract awarded. This contract went into effect on October 1, 1989 for
$210,966 for the base year and $215,463 for each option year with a total
contract price of $1,072,818. Ten military billets were deleted as a
result of this contract. Eleven modifications have been incorporated into
this contract and are summarized in Table XIII. Six modifications were
required as a result of Congressional continuing resolutions.
TABLE XIII
MODIFICATIONS TO CONTRACT DTCG89-89-C-70027
SUPPORT CENTER ALAMEDA SECURITY, ALAMEDA, CA























Bilateral Mod, Clauses added.
Contract begins 01OCT89.




35,161 Funds available 01-30NOV89.
210,966 Funds available 01DEC89 -
30SEP90
Contract Extension 01OCT90 -
30SEP91. DOL Wage Determination
87-38 08/13/89 (Rev 1) (End of
Base Year FY90 total - $210,966)
215,599 Limited Government funds
available 01-09OCT90.
(Continuing Resolution)
223,130 Funds available 10-24OCT90
228,922 Funds available 25-31OCT90





MODIFICATIONS TO CONTRACT DTCG89-89-C-70027
SUPPORT CENTER ALAMEDA SECURITY, ALAMEDA, CA







10 01OCT90 37, 621
11 03JAN91
464,049 DOL Wage Determination 87-38
08/13/89 (Rev 1) . Increase for
1st Option year. (1st Option
Year - FY91 estimated total cost
$253, 113 - See Mod 11)
Correct error in Mod 8 (Increase
was $5,762, corrected to $5,792)
Source: Contract file for Support Center Alameda Security, Alameda, CA
Contract Number DTCG89-89-C-70027, located at Maintenance and Logistics
Command, Pacific, Alameda, CA.
Performance in this contract has been determined to be marginally
satisfactory by the Commanding Officer of the Support Center (the
customer) and the COTR [10,22]. Also, some problems with the contractor
are still being experienced by the Government Contract Specialist two
years after contract award [25].
Early in the contract performance period, the contractor was unable
to obtain fully qualified personnel and turnover was unusually high. The
wage rate for this contract was lower than other security contracts in the
area and therefore it was difficult to attract and retain qualified
employees. Many of the new employees were hired off the street and were
at times given a uniform and told to learn their tasks on the job. This
was in violation with the contract specifications [10,22,25].
Both the Coast Guard contract specialist and COTR believe that the
lack of leadership and poor communication skills exhibited by the
contractor's PM was a contributing factor to the contractor's marginal
performance on this contract. The PM has been in the security field for
13 years and is the contractor' s PM in three other Government security
contracts in the Bay area. Even though the PM makes rounds at the Support
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Center, the COTR and contract specialist claim she is not actively
ensuring that the new employees are fully qualified until there is a
breach of security. The PM tends to operate at more of a working level
with other employees rather than in a supervisory role [25]
.
A major problem is the lack of Quality Assurance (QA) Plan by the
contractor, and the lack of a QA surveillance plan by the Government.
These plans are essential to successfully monitor and administer the
contract. The Contract Specialist has sent a letter to the contractor
requesting their overdue QA plan, and she has discussed the Coast Guard'
s
problem with the COTR, but neither plan has been completed [25] . The COTR
is a Chief Boatswain's Mate (BMC) and has been on the job for one year.
He has attended a USCG/contractor taught QA course and felt that while it
was helpful in contract fundamentals, it didn't adequately address COTR
duties and found it difficult to apply to this security contract. He has
requested assistance from the Contract Specialist in developing the QA
surveillance plan, but believes she is too busy with contract work to
assist him [22]
.
Deductions have been taken on this contract for unsatisfactory
performance. A deduction was taken after the latest modification was
issued for a contract employee sleeping while on roving patrol, and more
recently a deduction was taken for a watchstander missing a round and
later falsifying the watch log to cover-up the incident. Without the QA
surveillance plan, it was difficult to properly justify the amount of
these deductions.
There was and still is a problem in ensuring that the security force
is receiving the required training. Not all of this problem has been the
fault of the contractor. Firearms training is the responsibility of the
contractor. However, in the contract specifications, shotgun and
practical pistol range training is to be conducted by the Government.
There is an unresolved legal and policy issue which questions whether the
Coast Guard can provide firearms training to non-Government civilians.
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The contractor
PM' s supervisor in TABLE XIV
Anaheim, CA perceives COST INCREASES TO CONTRACT PRICE
SUPPORT CENTER ALAMEDA SECURITY SERVICE
the contract is 01OCT89-30SEP92*
operating smoothly and
stated that he wasn't Base Year: 01OCT89-30SEP90
aware of any Increase: None
deficiencies in the Option Year 1: 01OCT90-30SEP91
contract [19]. The PM Wage increase: $37,621
confirmed that the Option Year 2: 01OCT91-30SEP92*
beginning of the Wage increase: $37,621
Wage increase: $71,211*
contract was difficult
because of the initial
wage rate didn't ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Projected
attract good people, but wage increases have resulted in a more stable and
improved workforce [40].
Cost increases for this contract occurred due to a wage increase at
the end of the first option year for $37,621 (Mod 10) and it is expected
that this increase will be applied to future option years [25]. Because
this wage rate is still lower than other security contracts in the same
area, wages may continue to increase causing contract cost increases. In
August 1991, a new DOL wage determination for this contract was received
by MLCPAC. The new wage has increased by twice the amount of the last
wage increase. If this wage increase is requested by the contractor, it
is expected to be almost double the increase of Mod 10 [25] . A summary of
the actual and anticipated cost increases of this contract are provided in
Table XIV.
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C. CCMPARISOKS OF COST OF PERFORMANCE
The six commercial activities studied have experienced many contract
cost changes. To determine if the activities are operating at a savings
to the Government, a comparison was made of the actual cost with the
original contract cost, and the Government's Most Efficient Organization
(MEG) . Actual and original contract costs were obtained from the contract
file (if available) and also from the cost comparison conducted by
COMDT (C-CPE-4) . MEG costs for each of these activities are on file with
CGMDT (G-CPP-2) [47]. MEG costs were computed using instructions from the
OMB Circular, which include using current standard Government GS and
Military pay scales with annual inflation and retirement factors provided
by OMB. MEG costs are not maintained by the MLCPAC Contract Section
because A-76 service contracts are not differentiated from other service
contracts [57]
.
The initial annual contract award cost of an A-76 contract is used as
the base for Coast Guard Headquarters funding of these contracts. After
the initial funding was provided, the funding bases of these contracts
have not changed. Also, contract costs have not been reviewed by HQ to
see if costs have increased or decreased. At the MLCPAC or Coast Guard
District budgets manager levels, contracts that experienced cost overruns
are "covered" within the budget by those contracts or other accounts that
have cost underruns [26]
.
All of these contracts were initially awarded because they were lower
than the Government's MEO by 10% or greater of MEG personnel cost. Four
of the original contracts in this study (Base Honolulu housing
maintenance. Group San Diego food service. Support Center Seattle
security, and Support Center Kodiak food service) remained lower than the
original contract cost in their performance, therefore they remained lower
than the MEG. The cost comparisons of these four contracts and the simount
within the total MEG are shown in Table XV.
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TABLE XV
COST COMPARISON OF CONTRACT AND "SHOULD COST" MEO
Contract Costs %More(Less)
Activity Contract (K) Total Avq Annual Than MEO
Base Honolulu Ist K(5YR) 1,612,210 322,442 (42.9)
Housing Actual lst(6yR) 1,236,099 206,016 (70.7)
Maintenance 2nd K(5YR) ? ? 7
GOVT MEO (SYR) 3,511,736 702,347
Air Station 1st K(4.33YR) 1,378,200 318,291 (9.5)
San Diego 2nd K(5YR) 1,927,500 385,500 9.6
Food Service Actual (2YR) 614,469 307,234 (12.7)
GOVTMEO(5YR) *1, 758, 795 *351,754
Support Center Ist K(5YR) 1,044,287 208,857 (23.3)
Seattle Actual (5 . 5YR) 810,655 147,391 (45.9)
Security 2nd K(4.5YR) 709,010 157,557 (42.1)
GOVT MEO (5YR) #1,360,882 #272,176
Support Center 1st K(4.75YR) 3,861,000 812,842 (64.7)
Kodiak Food Actual (5 . 12YR) 3,621,199 707,265 (51,3)
Service 2nd K(4.88YR) 3,318,871 680,096 (53.2)
GOVT MEO (4. 75) 6,901,193 1,452,883
* - MEO should cost is less Contract Admin and "Other Costs"
associated with contract (not provided by G-CPP-2)
.
# - MEO may not be revised for reduced scope of contract in Ist K.
TABLE XVI
COST COMPARISON OF CONTRACT AND "SHOULD COST" MEO FOR BASE KETCHIKAN
Contract Costs %More(Less)
Contract (K) Total Avq Annual Than MEO
Base Ketchikan 1st K(5YR) 1,535,660 307,132 (2.5)
Food Service Actual lst(5.54YR) 1,641,928 296,377 (5.9)
GOVT MEO (5yR 86-91) 1,574,879 314,976
2nd K(4.46YR) 1,810,272 405,891 24.6
GOVT MEO (5YR 91-95) 1,628,715 *325, 743
* - MEO projected for 1991-1995
The MEO for Support Center Seattle's security contract does not
reflect the current contract conditions and Government savings may not be
accurately determined. The MEO needs to be recomputed because the
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original contract experienced a reduction in scope and significant drop in
contract price in the second option year. The MEO does not reflect this
change in security coverage. TABLE XVII
In the Base COMPARISON OF IN-HOUSE VS.
CONTRACT PERFORMANCE






r~) T" 1 f"* ^ ^ r f* V f^ ^ I q
Difference (39,219) (103,038) *357,828
differences that ^EO Pers Cost 722,859 800,927 *865,165
warrant closer Total % Greater (5.4%) (12.9%) *41.4%
(Less) than
inspection. Based ^^O pers Cost # - Adjusted * - Projected
1st K Actual 2nd K
(SYR) (5.54YR) (4.46YR)
K Price 1,535,660 1,641,928 1,810,272
Adjustments 85,671 94,923 *98,005
Total K Cost 1,621,331 1,736,851 *1, 908, 277
In-House MEO 1, 660,550 #1,839,889 *1, 550, 449
on the information
available, it is possible that the initial and second contract award
should not have been made. Table XVI shows an annual "should cost"
comparison using MEO information provided by COMDT (G-CPP-2) . The small
percentage "should cost" differences for the first contract (bid - 2.5%
and actual - 5.9%) and the high difference in the second contract price
(24.6%) should have been enough to prompt further analysis.
By reconstructing the cost comparison following 0MB Circular A-76
guidelines. Table XVII shows that even though the actual performance cost
was less than the MEO personnel cost by 12.9 percent, the original
contract price was less than the ten percent personnel cost increment (5.4
percent) and the contract should not have been awarded. Using a projected
contract cost growth from the first MEO based on average cost growth of
the original MEO, the total cost of the second contract is 41.4 percent
over the projected MEO. It is possible that this second contract price
was not compared with a revised MEO before award because of COMDT (G-CPP-
2)'s policy to not review renewed A-76 contracts unless there was a
reported problem in performance or excessive cost increase.
The two-year TABLE XVIII
old security CC»lPARISON OF IN-HOUSE VS
.
CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
services contract SUPPORT CENTER ALAMEDA SECURITY
for Support Center
1st K Actual/*
Alameda has (5YR) Projected Projected*
experienced a K Price 1,072,818 1,223,418 1,437,051




Difference (354,099) (204,703) 7,221
costs to come close MEO Pers Cost 1, 274, 374 1,274,374 1,274,374
to MEO costs. A Total % Greater (28 . 8%) (16.1%) 0.6%
(Less) than
projected wage MEO pers Cost
increase that may be * " First increase in effect option year 1-4
# - First increase in effect option year 1-4 and
taken in the second Second increase in effect option year 2-4
Total K Cost 1,335,131 1,484,527 1,696,451
In-House MEO 1, 689,230 1, 689,230 1, 689,230
option year will
cause the contract cost to be greater than the MEO by 0.6 percent of it's
personnel costs. COMDT (G-CPE-4) placed the solicitation for this contract
instead of MLCPAC, and it is believed that the DOL wage determination used
was low and inaccurate. However, neither the Department of Labor nor
COMDT were questioned about this wage determination prior to the release
of the solicitation [57] . Award of this contract was made to a contractor
who has at least three other Government security contracts in the Bay
area. Each of the other contractor's three activities had wages greater
than that offered by the Coast Guard contract [40] . The comparison of
this contract cost and MEO are provided in Table XVIII. If this contract
continues to experience wage increases at the same rate, it is estimated
that the contract costs may exceed the MEO' s personnel cost by up to 14
percent in the third option year. However, under present guidelines, this




Cost increases were experienced in all six of the commercial
activities studied. All but one of the contracts have resulted in a
continued savings to the Government. Cost increases were caused by wage
and food price increases and in three cases, work was added to the
contract. The additional work included "exercise meals" in a food service
contract and an additional guard in a security contract.
Cost increases in food service contracts were offset by end of the
fiscal year deobligations . Deobligations are made when the number of
meals sold are below the original contract estimate. Although meal
service is seen as satisfactory in these contracts, the number of meals
sold continues to decline. Although not fully explained, some of the
factors for this decline are alternate sources for meals, and a reduced
customer base from other contracted out billets that were deleted.
Motivated prior service Program Managers have resulted in relatively
successful food service contracts and maintaining the seime PM during
contractor changeover has helped smooth the transitions from one
contractor to another.
Contract administration of these contracts by MLCPAC is satisfactory,
however, contract extensions are the rule for most of these contracts. In
four out of the five cases, contract awards have been made from 1.5 months
to one year after the end of the contract's final option year. The delays
in contract award have been attributed to slow specification review and
approvals, long preparation time for negotiations, long DCAA audit lead
time, and a heavy contract specialist workload.
When contract administration was transferred from D17 to MLCPAC, it
was found that the contract files were incomplete. These contract files
should have been able to stand on their own for later review, however two
files reviewed could not fully explain why some actions were taken and
others were not. After MLCPAC began administration of these transferred
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contracts, filing discrepancies still occurred. Some contract actions
taken by MLCPAC could not be explained by the Contract Specialist or by
documentation in the contract file.
The COTR' s for these contracts studied have been assigned to the
contract for durations from three months to four years. They have various
backgrounds and levels of experience. All but one COTR has received COTR
or QA training, but outside of receiving a good basic knowledge of
contracting, many of the COTR' s believe that the courses provided little
training in their day to day COTR duties. The courses did not cover
lessons learned, and the methods presented to ensure quality assurance
were vague.
Cost savings to the Government were experienced in all contracts
studied except for the security services for the Support Center Aleuneda.
In this two-year old contract, a projected second option year wage
increase will cost more than the MEO' s in-house performance with the
contractor's personnel cost exceeding the MEO' s by 0.6%. The problem in
this contract is based on a possible low and inaccurate DOL wage
determination that wasn't questioned during the solicitation process.
Continued wage increases in this contract may cause the total contract
price to exceed the MEO personnel costs by up to 14 percent in the third
option year.
When the scope of the security contract for the Support Center Seattle
changed, it is unknown whether the Coast Guard had reviewed and adjusted
the MEO to see if savings were still being realized.
Using the original negotiated contract price for food service at Base
Ketchikan and 0MB Circular A-76 cost comparison guidelines, it appears
that the original and second contract should not have been awarded. Even
though the original contract's actual cost of performance was 14.3 percent
less than the MEO' s personnel cost, the original contract price was only
5.4 percent less than the MEO' s personnel cost instead of the required 10
percent. In the second contract awarded, the total cost exceeded
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projected MEO personnel cost by 37.3 percent. It is not known if this new
contract was compared with a revised MEO before award.
The value of the original contract is used as a basis for allocation
of funds by Coast Guard Headquarters for A-76 contracts, however funding




IV. PERCEPTIONS OF A-76 PROGRAM BY USCG PERSONNEL
While conducting the study of the causes of A-76 contract cost
increases, the general perceptions of Coast Guard leaders toward the A-76
process and it's effect on their units was assessed. Do these leaders
believe in the A-76 policy they are required to implement? What is the
relationship between the A-76 contractor and the Coast Guard at these
units? To collect and analyze these perceptions, specific questions
related to the commercial activities contracted-out and on A-76 were
included in the telephone interviews used to collect information on
reasons for contract cost increases. Coast Guard leaders in units with
commercial activities that remained in-house with a Most Efficient
Organization (MEG) were also interviewed for comparison purposes. The six
questions used were designed to gauge the perceptions of this small
population of Coast Guard leaders toward A-76 and its effectiveness in the
Coast Guard.
A. UNITS AND PERSONS INTERVIEWED
Commanding Officers (CO) and Executive Officers (XO) from eight Coast
Guard commands were interviewed. The following six commands interviewed
have A-76 contracted out commercial activities:
CG Base Honolulu Housing Maintenance
CG Group San Diego Food Service
CG Support Center Seattle Security
CG Support Center Kodiak Food Service
CG Group Ketchikan Food Service
CG Support Center Alameda Security, Food Service*
* - Not studied for cost increases
The following four commands retained commercial activities




CG Air Station Barbers Point, HI Food Service*
CG Training Center Petaluma, CA Security*
CG Group Ketchikan+ Base Industrial*
CG Support Center Seattle+ Base Industrial*
* - Not studied for cost increases
+ - Also have A-76 contracted-out Commercial Activities
Six CO' s and five XO' s responded to the interview questions. Those
that did not participate felt that they were unable to adequately respond
because they had only recently reported to their command. The ranks of
the CO' s and XO' s interviewed varied from a Lieutenant Commander (LCDR
(0-4) ) with ten years of service to a Captain (CAPT(0-6)) with 27 years of
service. All of these officers have served in the Coast Guard prior to
full A-76 implementation by the Coast Guard (1984) and as a group have an
average commissioning date of 1971 with a standard deviation of 4 . 4 years.
Many of the CO' s and XO' s also had past experience with A-76 contracts and
have witnessed it's effects (both good and bad) in previous assignments.
At each of their present units, they are at the highest customer level for
all of their commercial activities (whether contracted-out or performed
in-house) , and their commands are directly affected by A-76 policy. It is
possible that some of these persons interviewed could eventually move into
Coast Guard policy-making positions in their future careers and have an
affect on USCG A-76 policy implementation.
The following types of commercial activities were represented by the
corresponding number of CO' s and XO' s
:
Conroercial Activity CO 3CO Total
Food Service 4 3 7
Security 2* 1 3
Base Industrial 2* 1* 3
Housing Maintenance 11 2
* - CO' s/XO' s have more than one Commercial Activity at their unit
The responses to the questions may appear to have a situational slant
toward food service since five of 12 commercial activities discussed were
for food service. However, as information was gathered, those interviewed
provided a variety of responses.
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B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
There were six questions used during the interviews. Five of the
following questions were asked to those commands having A-76 contracted
out commercial activities (with possible anticipated responses) :
1. Is this commercial activity best conducted by military or
Government civilian employee, or civilian contractor?
(Military-Government civilian/Civilian contractor)
2. Are the specifications and contractor performance adequate for the
contracted-out activity? (yes/Qualified Yes/Qualified No/No)
3
.
Does the command have adequate control over the contracted-out
activity (Are responses and remedies to problems timely)
?
(Yes/Qualified Yes/Qualified No/No)
4. What is the command's overall relationship with the civilian
contractor? (Congenial/Neutral/Conflicting)
5. Do you believe that A-76 is a good process/idea?
(Yes/Qualified Yes/Qualified No/No)
CO' s and XO' s with MEO winners were asked to respond to questions one
and five above, and in addition were also asked:
6. Does the MEO need more personnel to adequately perform the
commercial activity? (Yes/No)
Some of the CO' s and XO' s interviewed had commercial activities that
were A-76 contracted-out, as well as MEO winners, so it was possible that
they responded to all questions as they applied to each activity.
Comments were encouraged for each question and are siommarized with each
response. Comments were not received for all responses.
C. RESPONSES TO INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
The responses for each question are presented in the following manner.
First, the question is given with the total number of persons answering
the question, followed by the responses. Each response is given with the
number of responses and its percentage. The type of commercial activity
addressed by the question follow the response with the number of CO' s/XO'
s
responding. The following abbreviations were used for the commercial
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activities: Food Service (FS) ; Security (SEC); Base Industrial (BI) ; and
Housing Maintenance (HM) . An "M" followed by a number denotes the number
of MEO winners in that response. Any coitiments received are summarized at




Is this commercial activity best conducted by military or




Response Nvin±>er Percentage Commercial Activity
Military/Civilian Enq>loyees 10 71% FS - 4 (M-1)
SEC - 3 (M-1)
BI - 2(M-2)
HM - 1





The Subsistence Specialist (SS) is more flexible than the contractor to
meet customer needs [7]
.
The contracted-out facility cannot adequately support the unit [7].
The contractor cannot quickly respond to anything outside of the
contract [7] .
We cannot correct problems within a day because we must use the
contract administration system [7]
.
There are many contract administration layers and time is a factor to
getting things done [7]
CG people don't know how to make a contract work, and contract
activities cause extra work to solve simple problems [7]
.
There is no Temporary Active Duty "pool" of Subsistence Specialists
(SS) who are sometimes needed to augment units that need replacements
[7,23] .
Limited shore billet opportunities for SS [23]
.
- Contracting out is very expensive. It seems that way when the meal
price for the customer is only a fraction of the cost to the Government
[23] .
- The unit cannot use its own discretionary funds in the contract [7]
.
There is no incentive to save money on A-76 contracts. If there is a
cost savings, part of the savings should return to unit funds [7]
.
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- Concerned with the financial condition of a contractor that declared
bankruptcy. If the contractor goes bankrupt (again) and stops paying
employees, there are not enough SS's available in the Seventeenth District
(Alaska) to step in and run the dining facility [7]
.
Food Service (FS) -MEO
Better quality management and control, less hassle in paperwork for the
unit [44] .
Security (SEC)
Added flexibility with military a factor. The military can be told
what to do for instant action/reaction [32].
- There is better control in training & job performance [10]
.
- The contractor cannot provide fully qualified employees, and employee




- More influence over military, where priorities can be changed easily.
[28]
- Security should represent command policy, and this is difficult to do
outside of an employer-employee relationship. [28]
Civilian Contractors;
Food Service (FS)
- The contract works well because of the quality of management [29]
.
- The CG tends to overuse people in support functions [56]
.
Usually not enough CG people to do the work (presently a non-rate
shortage in the Coast Guard (Enlisted personnel Seaman (E-3) and below)
[56] .
There is continuity with the contractor [56]
.
- Present contractor doing a great job, but difficult to find SS's to
relieve other units. [31]
Housing Maintenance (HM)
- There is no Coast Guard career path in the housing maintenance field.
The contractor can do the job more cost effectively and can devote the
time to make service work well [33]
.
c. Response Analysis
For this question, a majority (71%) of the CO's/XO'a
preferred Government employees over civilian contractor to perform their
commercial activity. All of the CO' s/XO' s with MEO winners preferred
Government employees. Influence over and flexibility in using employees,
and avoiding contract administration delays were given as key factors for
wanting Government employees over civilian contractors.
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All CO's/XO's with security activities preferred Government employees
over a civilian contractor. Major factors given for this were the ability
for instant response to changing conditions and the difficulty of
representing command policy outside of an employee-employer relationship.
Another reason was that the CO' s/XO' s trust factor was higher with a
military or Government employee over the civilian contractor, because they
had access to information on the employee' s personal background and
performance history.
In the food service area, the responses were nearly equal as to who
was preferred. This could be attributed to customer satisfaction at the
different activities. For the contracted-out activities at San Diego and
Ketchikan, and the MEO winner at Barber's Point, the facilities are well-
run and service is excellent, while operations and food services at Kodiak
and Alameda are satisfactory. Contract administration delays, the A-76
effect on the Coast Guard Subsistence Specialist (SS) rate, and the lack
of available SS' s for operational units were given as key reasons for
desiring military over civilian contractors. A majority of the comments
received in the interviews originated from this question.
2. Question Two
Are the specifications and contractor performance adequate for
the contracted-out activity? Total Responses - 8
« . Response Summary
Response Nxmnber Percentage Commercial Activity
Yes 5 63% FS - 4
SEC - 1
Qualified Yes 2 25% FS - 1
SEC - 1





Satisfied with the contractor's product [29].
The food quality has improved [56]
.
Good food with variety and quality [31].
The Project Manager is doing a great job [31].
Security (SEC)
- The job is sufficient. [32]
Qualified Yes :
Food Service (FS)
The specifications are too rigid. Can't anticipate changes [7].
The performance depends on who is managing the contractor facility [7]
.
Security (SEC)
Performance is marginally satisfactory. The Security Officer, COTR,
and his assistant spend a majority of their time working with the security




The Coast Guard does not have expertise at the unit level to write
adequate service contract specifications. A second tour LTJG was used to
write the original Performance Work Statement [33]
.
Persons assigned to monitor contracts are not adequately trained in
Quality Assurance. [33]
c. Response Analysis
Specifications for these A-76 contracts and contractor
performance were considered adequate in the majority of commercial
activities. Most of the positive comments came from food service
contracts where food quality and the strong performance of the
contractor's project manager were cited. However, in a security contract,
one CO commented that specifications were adequate, but performance was
marginal [10] . Another CO with a Housing Maintenance activity expressed
his concern with using inexperienced persons at the unit level to write
service contract specifications, and the lack of persons properly trained




Does the command have adequate control over the contracted-out activity
(Are responses and remedies to problems timely)
?




Response Number Percentage Commercial Activity
Yes 3 33% FS - 2
SEC - 1
Qualified Yes 3 33% FS - 2
SEC - 1





Control experienced within terms of the contract [23].




- Just enough control. The contracting process is cumbersome for changes
[29] .
Security (SEC)




- No timely response to problems and lost flexibility [7]
.
- With military would have better control [31].
Housing Maintenance (HM)
- Distance is a problem for contracts when the contract is in Hawaii and
the contract administration is in Alameda, CA. This has resulted in slow
response to contract questions [33]
.
- Centralization of contracting a disservice to customer [33].




The majority of CO's/XO's believe they have adequate control
over the contract within the terms of the contract. Problems identified
with control include distance between the contract site and contract
administration personnel, and the lack of timely responses from MLCPAC to
contract questions.
4 . Question Four
What is the commandos overall relationship with the civilian contractor?
Total Responses — 8












- There is a great relationship with the Project Manager (PM) [29].
- Professionalism is maintained [56]
.
- Excellent relationship with PM [23] .
Security (SEC)
- Very responsive to meet units needs within contract [32]
.
Housing Maintenance (HM)
Good relationship. The contractor wants to do good work and be paid
well, we should be fair and reasonable with them [33]
.
c. Response Analysis
All of the CO's/XO's interviewed that had A-76 contracted-out
commercial activities believed they had a congenial, professional
relationship between their units and the contractors.
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Question rive
Do you believe that A-76 is a good process and idea? Total Responses - 10
a . Response Sumnaxy
Response Number Percentage
Yes 0%




















- Good concept, but aware that the A-76 review could be a "dangerous
thing" as good civilians leave job and the MEO could be reduced just to
keep positions [56].
In implentation phase, contract start-up/renewal very choppy - slow and
unresponsive at first [29]
.
- Contract administration causes more work for the military, not hands
off (believed that it was easier to have activity as part of unit) [29]
.
- CG gives up billets and loses more than just a billet becauses CG
military personnel conducts not one, but many missions [29]
.
- Bad A-76 implementation by CG, and costs keep increasing [7]
.
Food Service (FS) -MEO
- Privitization is a good idea if conducted right, but in some places, it
hasn't worked. Poor service in the food service contract at Aviation
Training Center Mobile, AL is an example [44].
Security (SEC)
- A-76 cuts strength of Armed Forces. When military or civil emergencies
arise, can't be ready with trained personnel [10].
- A-76 cuts into depth of people available, contractors are not multi-
missioned [10] .
Housing Maintenance (HM)
- A-76 an excellent concept, but CG used as an excuse to reduce billets
when OMB directed CG billet reduction. [33]
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Qualified No: '
Security (SEC) /Base Industrial (BI) -MEO
Not the way A-76 is applied. There are many with negative attitudes
toward A-76 because of poor implementation [32]
.
The MEO cuts billets too much and morale is lowered for those who stay
on (same work with less people) [32]
.
No:
Food Service/Base Industrial (BI) -MEO
With A-76 contracts, it is difficult for an operational unit to
function [23] .
A-76 implementation did the Subsistence Specialist (SS) rate a
disservice with a high sea/shore assignment rotation [23].
Present SS's are not as experienced as before and we are losing good
people [23 ] .
Overall A-76 is not cost effective for the Government [23]
.
Security (SEC) -MEO
The Government shouldn't be privatized (opinion) [28]
.
Housing Maintenance (HM)
- The whole process is a bill of goods (opinion) [55]
.
c. Response Analysis
This question brought out a wide range of comments and was
second to question one in the number of comments. None of the CO's/XO's
would say that the A-76 was a completely good process. The majority of
responses were in the "Qualified Yes" response (60%) , with many of these
concerned that when a contractor' s employee takes away a Coast Guard
position, there is a loss of a multiple mission capability, and that the
Coast Guard's implementation of A-76 was poor. In the "No" to "Qualified
No" response (40%)
,
poor Coast Guard implementation of A-76 and its' bad
effect on the SS rate were given as comments.
6 . Question Six
Does the Government's Most Efficient Organization (MEO) need more
personnel to correctly perform the activity? Total Responses — 4
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a. Response Analysis
Response Number Percentage Commercial Activity







The MEO is very lean. The same work load is being carried by less
people which reduces our capabilities [32]
.
People now stretched-out throughout the Pacific Area [23].
Security (SEC) -MEO
People remaining in MEO too junior. We would prefer two additional
billets with upgraded positions, but haven't been able to pursue request
due to administrative workload [28]
.
Food Service (FS) -MEO
When fully staffed with Non-rated personnel service is fine, but the
Coast Guard-wide Non-rate shortage has impacted this activity [44].
c. Response Analysis
All of the CO's/XO's with MEO activities responded that they
needed more personnel to effect ly operate the commercial activity. In the
base industrial area, persons remaining after the billet reduction to MEO
were faced with the same workload and morale declined. In the security
area, higher rated enlisted positions were desired, and with the food
service MEO winner, a Coast Guard-wide Non-rated enlisted personnel
shortage was given as a reason they required more personnel. The reason
for the smaller number of responses in this question was that it was
directed to the CO's/XO's with MEO run commercial activities, and there
were only four interviewed for this study. The CO's/XO's interviewed were
not involved with the MEO determination for their commands or they had
arrived after the MEO was put into effect. The responses to this question
do not reflect a problem with the concept of A-76, but there is a problem
with the process in developing the Government's MEO. Reasons for an
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inadequate MEO workforce could be from incomplete specifications for the
commercial activity when the MEO was developed, or purposely undercutting
the MEO to ensure the Government retained the function in-house. If more
personnel are required for the Government to operate these commercial
activities, the MEO' s may need to be reevaluated and possibly the
commercial activity recompeted if necessary.
D. SUMMARY
The responses from the small population of Coast Guard CO' s and XO'
s
revealed the following beliefs and perceptions concerning A-76 and its
effect on their unit's commercial activities:
1. A majority of the CO's/XO's preferred Government employees over
a civilian contractor to perform their commercial activity. All of the
CO's/XO's with MEO winners preferred Government employees. More influence
and flexibility with employees, and avoiding contract administration
delays were given as the key factors for wanting Government employees over
contractors
.
2. Specifications for A-76 contracts and contractor performance are
adequate in the majority of commercial activities in this study. However,
one CO commented that performance was marginal in his security contract
[10]. Another CO expressed his concern with using inexperienced persons
at the unit level to write service contract specifications, and the lack
of persons properly trained in quality assurance [33]
.
3. The CO' s and XO' s believe they have adequate control over the
contractor within terms of the contract, but the contract administration
process is very cumbersome, and response time for answers from MLCPAC to
contract issues is very slow.
4. All of the commands have a congenial, professional relationship
with the contractors at their units regardless of their feelings toward
the A-76 process.
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5. A-76 as a process is one that is both accepted and questioned.
Many comments were provided in response to why it is a good process,
however, many believe that the Coast Guard's implementation of the A-76
program was poorly planned.
6. All MEO winners believed they needed more personnel to effectly
operate the commercial activity. Reasons given range from the MEO having
too few people doing the same job to a current non-rate personnel
shortage. This may require a more indepth review of the original MEO and




1 . Cost increases were experienced in all six of the
commercial activities studied and the Contracting
Officer has little control over these contract cost
increases
.
These cost increases were caused by wage and food price
increases, work added to the contract, and delays in follow-on contract
award
.
Wage determination increases by the Department of Labor (DOL) are
required to be passed on to the contractor. The DOL wage determination is
based on the prevailing wages in the area for a particular type of work.
When a wage increase based on the wage determination is requested by the
contractor, it must be incorporated into the contract . It is possible
that wages may decrease based on the local labor market, but for most
cases and in the contracts reviewed in this study, all wages have
increased.
Cost increases may be offset in food service contracts by end of the
fiscal year deobligations . A deobligation occurs when the number of meals
sold is less than the original contract estimate. However, while this
reduces contract costs, it is an unplanned action that normally results in
reduced service to the unit
.
Food prices are controlled by the Producer Price Index monitored by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. An increase in this index cannot be
anticipated or controlled by the Contracting Officer.
Better specifications or estimates can be used to avoid modifications
for added work in food service contracts. However, food service contracts
that have added work from large readiness exercises will continue to have
large volumes of meals required which will ultimately result in cost
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increases. These increases can't be controlled by the Contracting Officer
after contract award, unless readiness exercise meals are estimated in the
original contract.
In the contracts studied, five of six experienced excessive delay in
contract award for follow-on contracts. Some of these delays and contract
extensions have resulted in excessive contract cost increases. In some
cases, these increases could have been avoided through more advanced




Cost savings for the Government were experienced in
all contracts studied except for security services in
Support Center Alameda.
Five of six contracts studied experienced cost savings for the
Government . The savings resulted from the actual contract cost being
lower than the MEO, or lower than the original contract price. Cost
savings was not experienced in the Support Center Alameda security
contract because of a possible low and inaccurate DOL wage determination.
DOL wage determinations are not questioned when received by MLCPAC . In
the case of Support Center Alameda security, the DOL wage determination
was much lower than that given for other Government security contracts in
the area. If the wage determination for Support Center Alameda Security
was questioned, it is possible that a more realistic determination may
have resulted and the commercial activity may have remained in-house.
3 Current Most Efficient Organization (MEO) costs are
not available to MLCPAC Contract Specialists after the
contract is awarded.
This information could be used by the Contract Specialist to
determine if the Government is continuing to experience cost savings in
the A-76 contract. In the case of Support Center Seattle security, the
MEO was not adjusted to reflect changes in scope of contract work. As a
result. Government savings could not be accurately determined.
4.
The original and follow-on contracts for food service
at Base Ketchikan should not have been awarded.
OMB Circular A-76 requires that in order to award a contract to
the private sector, the contractor' s price must be lower than the
Government MEO' s personnel related cost by 10%. The original negotiated
contract price of the Base Ketchikan contract was less than the MEO cost
by only 5.4%.
For an A-76 contract to return in-house, the Government cost must be
below the contractor's cost by 10% (for a combined 20% below MEO) plus 25%
of the contractor's capital assets cost. In the second contract awarded,
the contract value exceeded the projected MEO costs by an estimated 41.4%.
5 MLCPAC Contract Specialists are not fully sensitized
to the impact of A-76 contracts on the Coast Guard.
The Chief of the Procurement Branch of MLCPAC expressed concern
for the rising cost of A-76 service contracts [57]. However, interviews
with MLCPAC Contract Specialists indicated that they were not as concerned
with cost increases, and viewed them as normal in service contract
administration. There was little to no differentiation in administering
an A-76 service contract and a regular service contract. While there is
no problem administering the contracts in this manner, the Contract
Specialists should be wary of excess cost increases to ensure that the
Government is still experiencing cost savings as compared to the MEO cost.
6 The overall Government Cost savings for USCG A-76
contracts may not be accurate.
Changes in contract cost are not taken into account for savings
computations. Presently, savings are computed based on the difference
between the award price of the initial contract and what it cost the
Government to perform the activity prior to the management review. This
cost savings is not reviewed or revised for differences in actual contract
cost during the contract performance period.
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7.
FundincT for MLCPAC A-76 contracts by Coast Guard
Headquarters does not increase with cost increases.
After initial funding for A-76 contracts by USCG Headquarters,
the amount required for the actual cost of the contract is not monitored.
The initial funding level does not change after contract award whether
actual costs increase or decrease. Presently PACAREA budget analysts use
end of fiscal year underruns in similar accounts to cover A-76 contract
cost overruns. This could be a problem if there are cost increases in a
majority of accounts and funds are not available to offset the shortfall.
Under the present practice, the Coast Guard is fortunate that this has not
occurred.
8 There is no standard Coast Guard contract post-award
maintenance procedure, which has resulted in contract
inconsistencies and added work for the Contract
Specialist
.
In the transfer of service contract administration from Pacific
Area Coast Guard Districts to the Maintenance & Logistics Command Pacific
(MLCPAC), there was added work for the receiving Contract Specialists.
This resulted from limited instructions upon relief and the lack of a
standard system of post-award record keeping. In this study, many actions
and discrepancies found in the contracts transferred from the Seventeenth
District to MLCPAC in 1986 could not be explained by the retained contract
documentation or the MLCPAC Contract Specialists.
Another example of problems in contract record keeping occurred when
deductions were taken for unsatisfactory contract performance. Deductions
for some MLCPAC contracts were not recorded as a reduction in cost in the
contract record and could not be verified.
9. Highly motivated prior military service project
managers make food service contracts work well for the
contractor and the customer.
The Contractor's Project Manager at Group San Diego and Base
Ketchikan are good examples of this. This fact was pointed out by
80
coiranents from the CO' s and XO' s concerning the quality of management and
cooperation exhibited by the project managers with prior military service.
10
.
Congressional Continuing Resolutions have caused extra
work for Coast Guard and Government service contract
administrators resulting in an unproductive use of
time
.
During the performance period of the six contracts studied,
thirty-five modifications were required for partial obligations to the
contractor as a result of "Continuing Resolutions". In the fall of 1987,
1989, and 1990, the U.S. Congress was unable to authorize the annual
operating budget for the U.S. Government, and as a result, they passed
Continuing Resolutions to keep the Government operating. In October 1990,
this was especially burdensome to the MLCPAC Contract Specialists when
three Continuing Resolutions three weeks apart required three contract
modifications for every service contract. The cost of this extra effort
was not calculated by the Coast Guard. However, this is an inefficient
use of the Contract Specialist's time.
11
.
The training received by the Contracting Officer's
Technical Representative (COTR) may be insufficient
for their assigned duties.
Many of the COTR' s interviewed expressed that much of the
training they attended provided good basic information on contracting, but
little training on how to conduct their day-to-day COTR duties.
12 The majority of CO' s and XO' s interviewed in this
study preferred military or Government civilian
personnel to perform the particular function.
Seventy-one percent of the CO's/XO's interviewed in this study
preferred Government employees over civilian contractors to perform the
particular function. All of the CO' s and XO' s with MEO winners preferred
Government employees over civilian contractors. More influence over
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Government employees, greater flexibility to overcome changing situations,
avoiding the cumbersome contract administration system, and less delays in
getting things done were given as key factors for their choice. Responses
also varied by commercial activity. Those CO' s/XO' s with food service
activities were nearly equal on their preference, while all CO' s/XO' s with
security activities preferred Government employees.
13 . The overall perceptions toward the requirements of A-
76 by Commandinq Officers and Executive Officers of
units with A-76 contracts and MEO winners are mixed
and vary by commercial activity.
The CO' s and XO' s perception toward the requirements of A-76
gathered in this study ranged from positive to very negative. The
controversial A-76 process is one that is accepted as a part of Government
operations, but its benefits are questioned. Many CO' s and XO' s agreed
that it is a good process in concept, but many are also aware of its'
potential danger in practice, citing as an example the damage done to the
Subsistence Specialist rating though the Coast Guard's implementation of
A-7 6. Many CO' s and XO' s believe that the Coast Guard's implementation of
A-76 was crisis driven and short-sighted.
Comments toward A-76 varied by the type of commercial activity, and
if the activity was contracted-out or run by the MEO. For excimple, at
food service activities contracted-out that were relatively successful,
most CO' s/XO' s supported the A-76 concept, but in those activities that
were unsatisfactory, there was little support of A-76. All CO' s and XO'
s
with MEO activities had a negative perception of A-76. Also, all
CO' s/XO' s with security activities (contracted-out and MEO) did not
believe A-76 was a good concept.
14
. Specifications and control of A-76 contracts and
contractor performance were considered adequate in the
majority of commercial activities studied.
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The contract specifications and control mechanisms in the
contract were considered adequate in a majority of the commercial
activities. Most of the positive comments toward this came in the food
service area. In a majority of the contracts, performance was adequate,
except in one security contract, where performance was considered
marginal. All of the commands had a congenial, professional relationship
with the contractor's at their units regardless of their feelings toward
the USCG A-76 policy, and their beliefs on who should run the activity.
15 . All CO' s and XO' s interviewed with MEO winning
commercial activities believe that they need more
personnel to effectively operate the activity.
Reasons given for this range from the MEO having too few people
doing the same job to a current non-rate personnel shortage. Many of the
CO' s and XO' s interviewed with MEO activities did not have input into the
development of the MEO. The process in developing the original MEO' s may
have been incomplete, which would require a review of the MEO' s and
possible recompetition if necessary.
B. RECC»lMENDATIONS
1
. MLC Pacific and MLC Atlantic should conduct periodic
comparisons and reviews of A-76 contract costs with
the current MEO cost to ensure that the Government is
still experiencing cost savings.
In this period of highly scrutinized budgets and emphasis on
reduced spending, MLC Contract Branches should be sensitive to excessive
contract cost increases to ensure that the Government is still
experiencing cost savings. This study has shown that without periodic
comparisons, contract cost increases may have exceeded the current MEO
cost in three cases and the Government may not be experiencing cost
savings as required by A-76.
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2.
The Coast Guard should review their procedures to
determine A-76 cost savings.
Government savings decrease as contract costs increase. Contract
costs may exceed current MEO costs. The Base Ketchikan food service and
Support Center Alameda security contracts are examples. Procedures should
be put in place to conduct annually update actual cost savings to more
accurately reflect Coast Guard cost savings under A-76.
3 The MEO for Base Ketchikan food service needs to be
reviewed.
The MEO cost for Base Ketchikan food service which covers the
original contract (FY86-90) should be reviewed, updated, and compared with
the current contract price to verify that the contract price continues to
be less than the Government's cost of performance. If the MEO cost proves
to be less than the contractor's price, the Coast Guard should consider




A team concept should be used in developing service
contracts
.
It was suggested by one CO interviewed that service contract
acquisition teams be formed when contracting-out certain commercial
activities [33] . This team should include the following members: Command
CO/XO, Contract Specialist, COTR/Unit Project officer. The purpose of the
team would be to ensure resources are identified to develop a Performance
Work Statement (PWS) and Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) that
meets the needs of the command. Examples of past PWS and QASP that are
applicable to the activity need to be made available and tailored as
appropriate
.
5 MLCPAC should improve record keeping methods to record
cost increases/decreases of the contract.
MLCPAC contract specialists should ensure that when deductions
for unsatisfactory performance are taken, they are reflected in the
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contract file. Also in many files, the original contract price was
difficult to determine. File maintenance is important to ensure accurate





The Coast Guard should implement a standardized Coast
Guard-wide format for maintaining post-award contract
files
.
This standard format could serve the Coast Guard by maintaining
contract files for easier contract review, reducing inconsistencies, and
making it easier to transfer contracts from one Contract Specialist to
another.
7 COTR training should be reviewed to ensure that the
material meets the needs of the Coast Guard COTR.
COTR training should include "lessons learned" as well as
stressing the daily duties of the COTR. Experienced and qualified COTR'
s
should be designated with Officer or Enlisted qualification codes and be
on file in the Coast Guard's personnel data base.
8 Contract Specialists should be proactive in
determining if customers are receiving the service
they have requested in the contract.
There should be an increase in the frequency of communications
and face-to-face meetings between the customer, contractor, COTR, and
Contract Specialists to ensure that the customer's needs are met. The
Contract Specialist also needs to be more aware of the unique requirements
and physical layout of some service contracts. This may require more on-
site meetings at the customer's facility.
If customers are unsatisfied with a contractor's service, they should
be aware of and actively use methods within the contract administration
system to correct inadequate performance. If remedies required to correct
problems are not in the contract, every effort should be made to
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incorporate them in the next contract modification or new contract.
Contract Specialists should strive to be customer-oriented and correct
problems with all resources available to them.
Contract Specialists should more closely emphasize the responsibility
determination to ensure the contractor is capable of doing the job. They
should be especially aware of the contractor's financial condition to
avoid surprise Chapter 11 filings by a contractor.
10 . Policy makers should be aware of the impact of A-76 on
personnel and programs .
Manpower considerations and planning need to be more seriously
considered in the decision to contract-out. In the Coast Guard, A-76
reviews and contracting-out were used guickly to meet OMB required billet
reductions. In the food service area, minimal consultation with personnel
planners resulted in severe billet structure problems in the SS rate.
Knowledge by employees that their agency leaders are showing appropriate
concern in this area would also improve employee perceptions of the
program. The current perception by a majority of CD's and XO'
s
interviewed is that the Coast Guard's implementation of A-76 was a poorly
executed effort .
There needs to be support, commitment, acceptance, and positive
perceptions from all persons involved for A-76 to be successfully
implemented, especially with today' s call for more efficient Government
spending. The A-76 process will not go away, even though concern for this
program by the Government has ranged from high to low with top-level
changes in each federal agency, the executive branch, and in Congress.
Internal dissent within federal agencies over A-76 seems proportional to
the rise and fall of the number of studies announced for the year and the
number of potential contracted-out military and civilian billets. Even
though A-76 activity has been greatly reduced in the Coast Guard, its'
impact is still being felt and dissent can still be heard.
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C. ANSWERS TO THESIS QUESTIONS
1
.
What are the primary causes of contract cost increases
for certain U.S. Coast Guard activities contracted-out
under A-76 and how might these increases be
controlled?
The primary cause of cost increases are increases in Department
of Labor (DOL) wage determinations, food price increases, added work, and
delay in follow-on contract award. Wage and food price increases cannot
be controlled by the Government's contracting officer. The increases in
DOL wage determination must be incorporated into the contract when
requested by the contractor. However, the Coast Guard may want to
question DOL wage determinations received that seem unreasonably higher or
lower than wages for the same work in the prevailing area. Food prices
also cannot be controlled by the contracting officer. Added work can be
controlled in some cases by ensuring that the specifications cover most
situations, however, in many cases, even with adequate specifications, the
added work will cause contract cost increases. Delays in follow-on
contract award which result in cost increases can be controlled by
advanced planning. However, in some cases, these delays have been
compounded by slow customer response to contracting officer questions, and
contract approval delays by Coast Guard Headquarters.
2
.
What is the general perception of A-76 by USCG units
with contracted-out commercial activities and those
with commercial activities remaining in-house?
The general perceptions of USCG units toward A-76 as seen through
the unit's CO' s and XO' s ranged from positive to very negative and also
vary by comnmercial activity.
The majority of CO's/XO's with contracted-out activities preferred
Government employees over the civilian contractor for their commercial
activities. CO's/XO's with food service contracts were nearly equal on
their preferrence, while all CO's/XO's with security contracts preferring
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Government employees. Units with MEO winners all preferred the Government
employee over a contractor, but all also would like to have more personnel
to operate their commercial activity.
Comments toward A-76 varied by the type of commercial activity, and
whether the activity was contracted-out or run by the MEO. For example,
at food service activities contracted-out that were relatively successful,
most CO' s/XO' s supported the A-76 concept, where in those activities that
were unsatisfactory, there was little support of A-76. All CO' s/XO' s with
security activities (contracted-out and MEO) did not believe A-76 was a
good concept. All CO' s and XO' s with MEO activities had a negative
perception of A-76.
Contract performance, specifications, and control mechanisms in the
contract were adequate for the majority of contracts studied. All of the
commands had a congenial, professional relationship with the contractor at
their units regardless of their feelings toward the USCG A-76 policy, and
their beliefs on who should run the activity.
3 . What is the contractinq-out policy under Office of
Management and Budqet Circular A-76 and how is the
program implemented in the Coast Guard?
The Government's policy stated in 0MB Circular A-76 is simply
that the Government is to rely on commercial sources to supply goods and
services. OMB-directed billet reductions and billets authorized for the
Coast Guard's A-76 program pushed the Coast Guard into full implemention
of A-76 in 1984. An A-76 task force was formed within the Coast Guard
(COMDT (G-A7 6) ) , and a review of all Coast Guard commercial activities was
conducted. As a result of this review, a schedule of A-76 reviews for
Coast Guard commercial activities was published. A number of problems
developed as Coast Guard commercial activities were contracted-out under
A-76. They included: problems in conducting the studies and developing
performance work statements; negative perceptions of A-76; COTR training;
cost increases; declining workforce morale and productivity; and an
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adverse affect on Coast Guard enlisted ratings. The Coast Guard A-76
program is presently being monitored by COMDT (G-CCP-2) . A-76 service
contracts in the Coast Guard's Pacific Area are being administered by
MLCPAC(fcp) . More detailed information on the Coast Guard's
implementation of A-76 are provided in Chapter II of this thesis.
4
.
What factors contribute to cost increases following
award of contracts solicited under A-76?
Cost increases are caused by increases in the Department of Labor
wage determinations, food price increases, added work, and delay in
follow-on contract award.
5 What has been the relationship between the contractors
and Coast Guard activities where A-76 contracts are
being performed?
The relationship between contractors and Coast Guard units has
been congenial and professional, regardless of the CO' s or XO' s feelings
toward the Coast Guard's A-76 policy, and the CO' s or XO' s belief on who
should run the activity.
6 What actions can be taken by the Coast Guard to reduce
or eliminate contract cost increases following award?
There are not many opportunities for the Coast Guard to reduce
or eliminate contract cost increases. The contracting officer cannot
control DOL wage determinations or food price increases. Added work can
be anticipated through adeguate contract specifications, but usually there
is still an additional cost incurred because of unexpected situations.
Delays for some follow-on contract awards can be prevented by adequate
advance planning. A MLCPAC suggestion to control costs would be to have
a cost ceiling clause incorporated into the contract. This could be set
at a level that would ensure that the contract cost stayed below the MEO





What is the U.S. Coast Guard perception of the
effectiveness of the A-76 process and results?
The perceptions of the CO's/XO's interviewed in this study on the
effectiveness of A-76 ranged from positive to very negative. The
controversial A-76 process is one that is accepted as a part of Government
operations, but its benefits are questioned. Many CO' s and XO' s agreed
that it is a good process in concept, but many are also aware of its'
potential danger in practice, citing as an example the damage done to the
Subsistence Specialist rating though the Coast Guard's implementation of
A-76. Many CO' s and XO' s believe that the Coast Guard's implementation of
A-76 was crisis driven and short-sighted.
8 Do Commanding/Executive Officers believe in the A-76
process?
Overall, the majority of CO' s and XO' s questioned believe in the
A-76 process, but no one agreed it was a completely good one. The CO'
s
and XO' s interviewed for this study have inherited the results of A-76
planning and implementation by their predecessors, and as a whole they are
not pleased with the implementation of A-76 by the Coast Guard. The haste
to implement the program, using inexperienced persons to write performance
work statements, the adverse impact on the Subsistence Specialist rating,
and reduced multiple mission capability from the displacement of personnel
were reasons given why many CO' s and XO' s are cautious about the process
and use of A-76.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following are suggested areas for further research:
• The method of costing used in 0MB Circular A-76. Is it accurate and
does it reflect real costs?
• Determine actual costs to conduct an A-76 study/review. Determine
method to place value on "flexibility" of multi-missioned
military/civilian government employees and compare or add this to
standard personnel costs.
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• Conduct additional studies of USCG A-76 contract cost increases to
determine if they can be avoided and whether there is still a cost
savings to the Government
.
• USCG budget procedures and practices concerning allocation of funds
for A-76 contracts. Are present procedures and practices effective?
• USCG service contract procedures. Compare with DOD procedures to
determine what works best and what doesn't work in each system.
• Total Quality Management (TQM) application to Coast Guard service
contracting. How can TQM be applied in this area?
• Conduct an extensive survey on A-76 perceptions at different
management levels to gauge the Coast Guard's acceptance of the A-76
process
.
• COTR training material content. Is it meeting the Coast Guard COTR'
s
needs?
• SBA section 8 (a) firms and small businesses used in USCG service
contracts. Determine indicators of successful and failed firms and
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